A while ago I had written a post on the surprisingly democratic campaign for the French referendum about the EU Constitution. Well, weeks have gone by, the No became threatening, and suddenly the campaign is not so ethical any more. There are 3 big problems.
First, when the official campaign started the media started to invite mainly represents of political parties. On TV we don't see much any more, representents of the civil society which gave a real edge in favour of the No over the professional politicians in favour of the Yes. Since the socialist party is officially in favour of the constitution, the members of the party who are against it (like Fabius), are less heard or shown in the media. These days, on TV, the No is defended by the Communists, the Trotskists, Le Pen and De Villiers (who is often called "Le Pen-light: for those who are not quite racist enough to vote for the real thing). Who's wondering why the No is not as strong as it was a few weeks ago ?
The second thing is that the media have started their own campaign and since, in a very large majority, they are in favour of the constitution, it's starting to look like good old fashion Maastricht treaty referendum propaganda. Commentators, journalists, analysts, all tell us how great the constitution is. Last week on the Internet page of the newspaper Le Monde, there was a poll which showed that 72 % of the participants believed that the media are pro-constitution. The proponents of the No have asked the constitutional council and now the Conseil d’Etat to intervene to guaranty the equal chances of the 2 sides. The former didn’t do anything about it and the later didn’t take its decision yet. Yesterday Mélanchon, one of the Socialists against the constitution, said that if this unequal campaign took place in Africa everyone would be calling for international observers to check that basic democratic rules are respected.
Fortunately, the third and last problem is slightly comical. During the whole campaign pro-Yes (or contra-No) have been saying how irresponsible it would be to vote No and that, all in all, it wouldn't be a rational thing to do. My feeling is that this argument makes people feel like voting No (almost as much as the argument "every thing in this constitution is perfect" ). When they realized that it wasn’t working so well, the UMP and the Socialists, or the media, asked people with wide moral authority to sing the same song hoping they would be more convincing. That’s how Jacques Delors, Simone Weil, Lionel Jospin all made their comeback (they are all people that the less charismatic leaders of their parties don’t wish to see back in the political life fulltime) and now the good Jürgen Habermas. This is starting to work, but the ultimate touch is voting in the name of the dead. Not any dead of course. The dead that make you want to vote like them: De Gaulle and Mitterrand. Some people who think they are invested with the mystical power to speak in the name of the dead, tell us that these fathers of the Nation would have voted Yes. Charming! The problem in the case of Mitterrand is that his widow is saying that in fact he would have never accepted this constitution.
When we start having debates about how a corrupt ex-president, who died a few years ago will be voting in his tomb on May 29th, we can draw 2 conclusions: 1/ proxy voting has sure improved over the past years, 2/ we’re not discussing the real issues any more.
Wednesday, May 11, 2005
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
Passive Smoke and State Responsibility
An historical sentence of the Rome tribunal condemns the State to pay 400.000 euros to the family of a victim of passive smoke. The victim was a lady who worked for the public sector. Question: How will the state cope with thousand of similar cases that will be brought to courts?
European Muslims for the Constitution?
This seems to be the case according to an article in LeMonde.
Monday, May 09, 2005
Europe Day
The European Constitution, in its article I-8, states the symbols of the Union:
The flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background.
The anthem of the Union shall be based on the 'Ode to Joy'from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven.
The motto of the Union shall be: 'United in diversity'.
The currency of the Union shall be the euro.
Europe day shall be celebrate on 9 May throughout the Union.
Today, 9 May 2005, especially in France, people debate and exchage freely their ideas on what kind of Europe they want. This will be determined by a constant popular engagement, and not by a text, even if a constitutional text. The European Constitution is only a framework that entrenches social principles along with market economy.
We'll have to constantly refine the balance between a social Europe and a competitive Europe. This creative, beautiful, tension will not disappear after the ratification of the Constitution. On the contrary, it will be the engine for more progress, and hopefully for the enhancement of well-being within and without Europe.
The flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background.
The anthem of the Union shall be based on the 'Ode to Joy'from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven.
The motto of the Union shall be: 'United in diversity'.
The currency of the Union shall be the euro.
Europe day shall be celebrate on 9 May throughout the Union.
Today, 9 May 2005, especially in France, people debate and exchage freely their ideas on what kind of Europe they want. This will be determined by a constant popular engagement, and not by a text, even if a constitutional text. The European Constitution is only a framework that entrenches social principles along with market economy.
We'll have to constantly refine the balance between a social Europe and a competitive Europe. This creative, beautiful, tension will not disappear after the ratification of the Constitution. On the contrary, it will be the engine for more progress, and hopefully for the enhancement of well-being within and without Europe.
Friday, May 06, 2005
Reasons of the change of heart of a left-wing voter in the referendum on the EU constitution
The referendum on the EU constitution that will take place on May 29 in France has become by far the main object of interest in this country. Every night, on television, promoters of the “Yes” debate with promoters of the “No”. Politicians, artists, academics, student and workers all participate in the debate. Retired politicians make their come back (L. Jospin, J. Delors) and recently, S. Veil, a constitutional council judge, temporarily left her functions in order to participate freely in the debate. In my university alone (Paris X-Nanterre), during the last month, M. Barnier, Minister of foreign affairs and R. Badinter, ex-Minister of Justice and ex-President of the constitutional council, have been scheduled to speak in front of the students. The students, themselves, are putting up stands at the entrance of the University inviting all interested in discussing the constitution to confront their arguments.
The last time, the French population was able to vote on a European Treaty in was in 1992 for the Maastricht Treaty. The debate then, was nothing like this one. A very large consensus inside the political world prevented any real opposition to the adoption of the Treaty and thus any reason for a passionate debate.
This time around things are different. There is strong left-wing opposition to the EU Constitution. In 1992, the nationalists (Front National) were against the adoption of the Treaty, as were the extreme left-wing parties (Parti Communiste Français, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and Lutte Ouvrière), there was also an opposition to the treaty inside the two main political parties (J-P. Chevènement in the Parti Socialiste, C. Pasqua and P. Seguin in the RPR, now UMP) that drew a minority of voters from their parties but didn’t jeopardize the victory of the “Yes”. All these people are active in this year’s campaign, but if their victory seems more likely (the last poll shows a parity of the 2 positions in the public opinion) it is because they have been joined, in their opposition to the EU Constitution, by a much larger body of non-affiliated left-leaning members of the civil society.
From a national perspective one of the fundamental aspects of this campaign is the division of the French parliamentary left-wing into two camps that transcend the old distinctions between communists and social-democrats. Thus, the division exists even inside the moderate social-democrat parties (i.e. Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party) and Les Verts (the Greens)). The dilemma whether or not to accept a free-market capitalism alla americaine continues to cause rupture within these parties. This is mainly what the actual debate is about.
The arguments of the left-wing proponents of the No can be resumed in the 3 following points: 1/ The EU Constitution is not a proper constitution; 2/ the institutional arrangements that it determines are not democratic enough; 3/ it entrenches an economical liberal ideology; 4/ some fundamental rights provisions contradict typically French republican conception of the State.
1. The first point touches upon the way the text was elaborated (a), the types of provisions it contains (b) and the process for amending it (c). a) The constitution was elaborated by representatives of the Member States and European institutions that lacked a clear popular mandate. Furthermore the people, inside the Member States, were not sufficiently informed about the process of the drafting of the Constitution. While it was going on the media and the national politicians did not make an important issue of it. They ignored the dictum that elaboration and adoption of a constitution is an event in political life that requires massive involvement of the people, otherwise it risks lacking completely a required legitimacy. b) Part three of the EU constitution contains provisions that are not neutral in the sense that they stem from a precise ideology which is far from being shared unanimously. The constitution should be based on a consensus on certain institutional arrangements and some fundamental rights, the rest (i.e. all the controversial issues) should up for grabs. Hence, it should be left to legislative politics, not entrenched in constitutional provisions. c) In order to amend the EU Constitution, unanimity among the member states is required. This causes a stalemate of a normal constitutional amendment process that suggests that a constitutional change should occur whenever a large majority agrees on a change of the constitution. This requirement is especially important whenever a Court – such European Court of Justice – is empowered to strike down laws on the basis of constitutional provisions.
2: The second point criticises the institutional arrangements of the EU Constitution for not being democratic enough. The crux of this critique is that the EU Parliament is not invested with enough power (a), on the main political issues, unanimity of Member States is required (b), the executive branch will be inefficient (c). a) The only institution with a legislative initiative is the commission; it is still denied to the Parliament, which doesn’t determine the taxes either. b) In the main domains – foreign affairs, defence and fiscal issues – any policy requires unanimity among the member States. This will make it very hard to adopt any ambitious policy outside Europe or inside and allow a minority to rule by blocking initiatives of the majority. c) The executive branch will be separated in 4 distinct authorities: the Commission, the Council, the European Council and the European Central Bank. Furthermore the European Council and the Council will both have Presidents that could, depending on the circumstances, develop rivalry relationships with the President of the Commission. All of this will render difficult the adoption of any clear political position and thus contribute to making the European institutions politically weak.
3. The third point is insisted that economic liberal ideology holds a monopoly over the EU Constitution (a) the proclamation of liberal values, (b) the constitutionalisation of liberal policies (c) and the prohibition to adopt interventionist policies in important domains. a) Part I of the EU Constitution states as one of its objective “an internal market where competition is free and undistorted”; throughout the text many provisions that rest on liberal values clearly demonstrates that the majority of the founding fathers were economic right-wingers. A Constitution which establishes a set of consensual rules according to which the political game is supposed to evolve, should not proclaim its faith in a particular ideology. b) Part III of the constitution does the same, not with values, but with specific policies; this, as was pointed out before, should be left to legislative decisions. c) Any policy contrary to the proclaimed values of the Union is tacitly forbidden through several mechanisms and provisions: the impossibility of any volontarist fiscal policy, the total independence of the Central Bank, the incompetence of the European Union in the domain of labour law and salaries. This impossibility to have any social policies at the European level along with the liberalisation of the market constrains the States to abandon social rights or fiscal policies at their own level.
4. Finally, some people fear that the principle of laicité or the refusal to recognize cultural minorities which are cosubstantial with the French constitutional history will be compromised by some of the fundamental rights in part II of the Constitution. This fear, however, is not shared by all opponents of the Constitution.
I believe that most of these arguments are relevant. They would have to be formulated with more nuances to resist some serious attacks coming from the proponents of the Constitution but they are definitively not irrational and emotive as J. Habermas pretends in an article published recently in Le Monde. Still, after having defended a vote against the Constitution, I have changed my mind and will vote Yes on the 29th. Why ? For three simple reasons. Firstly, because the drafters of this controversial text had the courage to call it a Constitution. Symbolically it has great meaning and thus represents a formidable step forward in the construction of a European political community. Secondly because I believe that in the near future we can keep the good symbol while changing the bad content of the constitution in order to make it acceptable to those who resist it now on the basis of a left-wing ideology. The unanimity rule will make it difficult but not impossible. Thirdly, because, as many critics pointed out, no current political force is capable of proposing an ambitious alternative to this liberal project. If we must work at forging such a project in the coming years, then let’s do it together with the force, the creativity and the knowledge that is brought about by political mixing (métissage politique).
Raphael Paour, PhD researcher at the European University Institute in Florence and lecturer at the University of Evry, in France.
The last time, the French population was able to vote on a European Treaty in was in 1992 for the Maastricht Treaty. The debate then, was nothing like this one. A very large consensus inside the political world prevented any real opposition to the adoption of the Treaty and thus any reason for a passionate debate.
This time around things are different. There is strong left-wing opposition to the EU Constitution. In 1992, the nationalists (Front National) were against the adoption of the Treaty, as were the extreme left-wing parties (Parti Communiste Français, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and Lutte Ouvrière), there was also an opposition to the treaty inside the two main political parties (J-P. Chevènement in the Parti Socialiste, C. Pasqua and P. Seguin in the RPR, now UMP) that drew a minority of voters from their parties but didn’t jeopardize the victory of the “Yes”. All these people are active in this year’s campaign, but if their victory seems more likely (the last poll shows a parity of the 2 positions in the public opinion) it is because they have been joined, in their opposition to the EU Constitution, by a much larger body of non-affiliated left-leaning members of the civil society.
From a national perspective one of the fundamental aspects of this campaign is the division of the French parliamentary left-wing into two camps that transcend the old distinctions between communists and social-democrats. Thus, the division exists even inside the moderate social-democrat parties (i.e. Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party) and Les Verts (the Greens)). The dilemma whether or not to accept a free-market capitalism alla americaine continues to cause rupture within these parties. This is mainly what the actual debate is about.
The arguments of the left-wing proponents of the No can be resumed in the 3 following points: 1/ The EU Constitution is not a proper constitution; 2/ the institutional arrangements that it determines are not democratic enough; 3/ it entrenches an economical liberal ideology; 4/ some fundamental rights provisions contradict typically French republican conception of the State.
1. The first point touches upon the way the text was elaborated (a), the types of provisions it contains (b) and the process for amending it (c). a) The constitution was elaborated by representatives of the Member States and European institutions that lacked a clear popular mandate. Furthermore the people, inside the Member States, were not sufficiently informed about the process of the drafting of the Constitution. While it was going on the media and the national politicians did not make an important issue of it. They ignored the dictum that elaboration and adoption of a constitution is an event in political life that requires massive involvement of the people, otherwise it risks lacking completely a required legitimacy. b) Part three of the EU constitution contains provisions that are not neutral in the sense that they stem from a precise ideology which is far from being shared unanimously. The constitution should be based on a consensus on certain institutional arrangements and some fundamental rights, the rest (i.e. all the controversial issues) should up for grabs. Hence, it should be left to legislative politics, not entrenched in constitutional provisions. c) In order to amend the EU Constitution, unanimity among the member states is required. This causes a stalemate of a normal constitutional amendment process that suggests that a constitutional change should occur whenever a large majority agrees on a change of the constitution. This requirement is especially important whenever a Court – such European Court of Justice – is empowered to strike down laws on the basis of constitutional provisions.
2: The second point criticises the institutional arrangements of the EU Constitution for not being democratic enough. The crux of this critique is that the EU Parliament is not invested with enough power (a), on the main political issues, unanimity of Member States is required (b), the executive branch will be inefficient (c). a) The only institution with a legislative initiative is the commission; it is still denied to the Parliament, which doesn’t determine the taxes either. b) In the main domains – foreign affairs, defence and fiscal issues – any policy requires unanimity among the member States. This will make it very hard to adopt any ambitious policy outside Europe or inside and allow a minority to rule by blocking initiatives of the majority. c) The executive branch will be separated in 4 distinct authorities: the Commission, the Council, the European Council and the European Central Bank. Furthermore the European Council and the Council will both have Presidents that could, depending on the circumstances, develop rivalry relationships with the President of the Commission. All of this will render difficult the adoption of any clear political position and thus contribute to making the European institutions politically weak.
3. The third point is insisted that economic liberal ideology holds a monopoly over the EU Constitution (a) the proclamation of liberal values, (b) the constitutionalisation of liberal policies (c) and the prohibition to adopt interventionist policies in important domains. a) Part I of the EU Constitution states as one of its objective “an internal market where competition is free and undistorted”; throughout the text many provisions that rest on liberal values clearly demonstrates that the majority of the founding fathers were economic right-wingers. A Constitution which establishes a set of consensual rules according to which the political game is supposed to evolve, should not proclaim its faith in a particular ideology. b) Part III of the constitution does the same, not with values, but with specific policies; this, as was pointed out before, should be left to legislative decisions. c) Any policy contrary to the proclaimed values of the Union is tacitly forbidden through several mechanisms and provisions: the impossibility of any volontarist fiscal policy, the total independence of the Central Bank, the incompetence of the European Union in the domain of labour law and salaries. This impossibility to have any social policies at the European level along with the liberalisation of the market constrains the States to abandon social rights or fiscal policies at their own level.
4. Finally, some people fear that the principle of laicité or the refusal to recognize cultural minorities which are cosubstantial with the French constitutional history will be compromised by some of the fundamental rights in part II of the Constitution. This fear, however, is not shared by all opponents of the Constitution.
I believe that most of these arguments are relevant. They would have to be formulated with more nuances to resist some serious attacks coming from the proponents of the Constitution but they are definitively not irrational and emotive as J. Habermas pretends in an article published recently in Le Monde. Still, after having defended a vote against the Constitution, I have changed my mind and will vote Yes on the 29th. Why ? For three simple reasons. Firstly, because the drafters of this controversial text had the courage to call it a Constitution. Symbolically it has great meaning and thus represents a formidable step forward in the construction of a European political community. Secondly because I believe that in the near future we can keep the good symbol while changing the bad content of the constitution in order to make it acceptable to those who resist it now on the basis of a left-wing ideology. The unanimity rule will make it difficult but not impossible. Thirdly, because, as many critics pointed out, no current political force is capable of proposing an ambitious alternative to this liberal project. If we must work at forging such a project in the coming years, then let’s do it together with the force, the creativity and the knowledge that is brought about by political mixing (métissage politique).
Raphael Paour, PhD researcher at the European University Institute in Florence and lecturer at the University of Evry, in France.
EU Constitution against « La République, une et indivisible » and laïcité
Some people in France are concerned that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE), especially its Part II (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union), might actually lead towards the abolishment of the principle so dear to the French constitutional tradition, the principle that presents a constitutional denial of ethnic, national minorities in France. The French legal system does not offer a legal recognition to such minorities. The fact that an individual citizen might be German, Corsican, Arabic, Spanish, etc., matters as much as someone’s religious affiliation. In the public sphere everyone is French while in the private sphere they can be whatever they want, Micky Mousians, Corsicans…same difference. This is the essence of the principles of laïcité and « La République, une et indivisible ».
At the time of the French Revolution, when this principle was introduced it was considered as presenting a break with traditional society of the ancien regime, a system that knew of legally recognized and nourished differences in social status, religious affiliation, nationality…The aforementioned Jacobin principle presented a break with conservative legal system and an innovation of modernity. Today, the situation is different. Most liberal-democracies, in one way or another, espouse basic tenants of multiculturalism, while France (and a couple of other states) still stubbornly resists. The situation today, seems exactly the opposite to that of the French Revolution, it is the principles of « La République, une et indivisible » and laïcité, that is considered retrograde, while multiculturalism (i.e. legal recognition of national minorities and their rights) seems to belong to the progressive current of contemporary political philosophy. This blog-entry will not try to resolve this normative dilemma for it believes that every country has a right to stick to its constitutional tradition to a certain extent (especially when such provisions do not seem bluntly contrary to the trends of modern liberalism-and the French system is not). The intention of this blog-entry, is rather to briefly examine the relationship between the aforementioned French Jacobin tradition and the TECE.
Is the TECE, if it comes into force, going to destroy the principle of « La République, une et indivisible » and make of France, a multicultural state like America, or even a “multinational federation” like Canada or Belgium?
According to some commentaries, the article II-70 of TECE, establishing Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, goes in the direction of multiculutralism (For an interesting debate on these issues see).
According to some interpretation of II-70, arguing that,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”
the French law on head-scarves, for example, could possibly be abolished for it is not in concordance with the EU Constitution.
Another, ‘suspiciously’ multiculturalist provision, is the following one,
“The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” (Article II-82)
Although ambiguous, this article could possibly be interpreted as to give it a multiculutralist meaning.
Could respecting religious diversity include promoting Corsican independence or autonomy? Probably not, main partisans of the national minority rights, secessionist claims, in the EU political arena, criticized the Constitution exactly for the opposite. These, so-called partisans of internal enlargement, as it was already argued in this blog, criticized the TECE for preventing the possibility of internal enlargement through several provisions. Most illustrative provision preventing any thought of territorial dismemberment of the EU Member States is the following,
“[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including those for ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, and for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security.” (Article I-5)
Finally, it seems that the TECE does not present a real threat to the French system. It is, however, certain that the Title II might be possibly regarded disgusting by a consistent Jacobin. Nevertheless, it would be exaggerated to claim that for this reason, Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, the chief of the founding fathers of TECE, deserves a guillotine and that France is bound to be forced to become a multicultural state.
At the time of the French Revolution, when this principle was introduced it was considered as presenting a break with traditional society of the ancien regime, a system that knew of legally recognized and nourished differences in social status, religious affiliation, nationality…The aforementioned Jacobin principle presented a break with conservative legal system and an innovation of modernity. Today, the situation is different. Most liberal-democracies, in one way or another, espouse basic tenants of multiculturalism, while France (and a couple of other states) still stubbornly resists. The situation today, seems exactly the opposite to that of the French Revolution, it is the principles of « La République, une et indivisible » and laïcité, that is considered retrograde, while multiculturalism (i.e. legal recognition of national minorities and their rights) seems to belong to the progressive current of contemporary political philosophy. This blog-entry will not try to resolve this normative dilemma for it believes that every country has a right to stick to its constitutional tradition to a certain extent (especially when such provisions do not seem bluntly contrary to the trends of modern liberalism-and the French system is not). The intention of this blog-entry, is rather to briefly examine the relationship between the aforementioned French Jacobin tradition and the TECE.
Is the TECE, if it comes into force, going to destroy the principle of « La République, une et indivisible » and make of France, a multicultural state like America, or even a “multinational federation” like Canada or Belgium?
According to some commentaries, the article II-70 of TECE, establishing Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, goes in the direction of multiculutralism (For an interesting debate on these issues see).
According to some interpretation of II-70, arguing that,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”
the French law on head-scarves, for example, could possibly be abolished for it is not in concordance with the EU Constitution.
Another, ‘suspiciously’ multiculturalist provision, is the following one,
“The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” (Article II-82)
Although ambiguous, this article could possibly be interpreted as to give it a multiculutralist meaning.
Could respecting religious diversity include promoting Corsican independence or autonomy? Probably not, main partisans of the national minority rights, secessionist claims, in the EU political arena, criticized the Constitution exactly for the opposite. These, so-called partisans of internal enlargement, as it was already argued in this blog, criticized the TECE for preventing the possibility of internal enlargement through several provisions. Most illustrative provision preventing any thought of territorial dismemberment of the EU Member States is the following,
“[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including those for ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, and for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security.” (Article I-5)
Finally, it seems that the TECE does not present a real threat to the French system. It is, however, certain that the Title II might be possibly regarded disgusting by a consistent Jacobin. Nevertheless, it would be exaggerated to claim that for this reason, Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, the chief of the founding fathers of TECE, deserves a guillotine and that France is bound to be forced to become a multicultural state.
Tony Blair and the European Challenge
Tony Blair secured his third term. For the labour party, this is an historic victory. Never before in the past century a leader of that party could win three times in a row. For Tony, however, this was not a challenge. Ok, he had to endure a loss of a certain number of seats because of the opposition to the war in Iraq; but at the end of the day, a reduction of the number of seats in parliament is not a defeat after 8 years.
The real challenge Tony has to face is Europe. More precisely, he has to face the constitutional challenge. In the past 8 years, he has largely contributed to the shaping of a Europe á la Blair. The constitution is the way it is because of his continuous negotiations. In short, he has been very active at the European level. Also, he promised various times to that he would ask his people about Europe, the Euro, and now, about the nice packet of the European Constitution. It is still unclear whether Tony will fight this deadly (for him) battle if France votes for the No. It may not be very useful.
I am convinced though that he is desperate to become the future head of the European Council as designed by the European Constitution. After all, he is half the leader he used to be in his domestic environment. His image is fading away there, and he surely feels the pressure coming from everywhere: from the bottom (Brown), from the side (lib-dem and tories), from the top (Bush), from inside (he is still young, today 52 years old). For sure, he wants to become something new, something more. His friend Bill is not doing very well, although he may be thinking how to get Kofi Annan's place.
I am not sure whether a scenario with Tony Blair as president of the European Council, and Bill Clinton as head of the UN is feasible, nor whether it is desirable. But I am confident they will give it a try.
The real challenge Tony has to face is Europe. More precisely, he has to face the constitutional challenge. In the past 8 years, he has largely contributed to the shaping of a Europe á la Blair. The constitution is the way it is because of his continuous negotiations. In short, he has been very active at the European level. Also, he promised various times to that he would ask his people about Europe, the Euro, and now, about the nice packet of the European Constitution. It is still unclear whether Tony will fight this deadly (for him) battle if France votes for the No. It may not be very useful.
I am convinced though that he is desperate to become the future head of the European Council as designed by the European Constitution. After all, he is half the leader he used to be in his domestic environment. His image is fading away there, and he surely feels the pressure coming from everywhere: from the bottom (Brown), from the side (lib-dem and tories), from the top (Bush), from inside (he is still young, today 52 years old). For sure, he wants to become something new, something more. His friend Bill is not doing very well, although he may be thinking how to get Kofi Annan's place.
I am not sure whether a scenario with Tony Blair as president of the European Council, and Bill Clinton as head of the UN is feasible, nor whether it is desirable. But I am confident they will give it a try.
Thursday, May 05, 2005
UK Elections and International Law
Today, voters in the UK are voting in what promises to be a fascinating general election. It is, however, of particular interest to those of us with an interest in public international law, for we find ourself in the unique situation in which our chosen discipline is a central issue, perhaps the central issue, in the mind of the electorate as they cast their votes. The recent, timeous leak of Lord Goldsmith's advice on the legality of war in Iraq has, of course, pushed it to the forefront; however, the is every reason to suspect that it would have been a dominant issue this notwithstanding.
In the minds of the British public (and correctly so in my view), Blair took us into an illegal war. The technical point (which I have discussed here), that he had advice from his advocate general that, given prior UK practice, our international legal obligations would be discharged if the case for war was "reasonably arguable" seems both dubious and somehow irrelevant in this regard; Blair's legal arguments are certainly, at best, shaky - and the public knows this. Has international law ever featured so prominently in an election campaign?
It may be argued that, according to the polls, Blair will still win, and win quite comfortably (although the latest suggest that enough are still undecided to make the result closer than many are predicting). However, to infer from this that the international legality of the Iraq war is a non-issue would be simply wrong. Such a reduction ignores both the complexities of this particular campaign, and the pathologies of the UK electoral system more generally. The first question may be - if Iraq is such a big deal, why haven't voters switched to the Tories? The answer is quite simply that the Tories were very vocal in their support for the war, and left few in any doubt that they would have acted in almost exactly the same way given the chance. Howard's recent attempts to recapture the anti-war vote, by accusing Blair of lying (an unusual tactic, even in an election campaign) has come accross more as cynical opportunism than principled politics. It should, of course, also be borne in mind that, in general, those who opposed the war were on the left of the political spectrum, and are unlikely to vote Tory in any event.
So why, then, have the Liberal Democrats, who have positioned themselves to the left of New Labour generally and who were the only major UK party to actively oppose the war (and always did so on the grounds of its illegality, rather than immorality) not seen the surge in the polls that one may expect if voters really care about Iraq? The answer lies in the pathologies of the UK system, which, as in the US, strongly favours an essentially two-party setup. The Liberal Democrats have never even been near power; and voters do not see them as a genuinely viable alternative for government. They will, of course, benefit from a protest vote, but these are always significantly less at general than at local or by-elections. Proof of this, if proof be needed, is furnished by Labour's campaign strategy of late: the latest posters, for example, proclaim 3 ways to get a Tory government: Stay at home, vote Tory, or vote Lib Dem.
Furthermore, even if Labour (and this is by no means certain) do not suffer overly at the ballot box, there can be no bdoubt that Blair himself has. The levels of trust placed in him by the electorate has plummetted, with polls now suggesting that, had Gordon Brown been leading the party into the election, another Labour landslide would be on the cards. The implication is clear: Blair, for the first time in his career, is a political liability; he is damaged goods.
Public international law, then, is, perhaps for the first time, at the absolute heart of a general election at the UK, and will have a serious impact, if not on who forms the next Government, then certainly on both the size of his majority and the length of time he will remain at the head. And this, perhaps, points to one of the strengths of international law that few of its critics recognise: it provides an (admittedly imperfect and indeterminate) focal point around which actors of many diverse views and with many divers projects can rally in critique of and opposition to the actions of the powerful. There seems little doubt that, without such a standard, domestic opposition to the Iraq War would quickly have fragmented and dissipated. This point holds both at the global level, among states and other international actors, and, in democracies at least, at the domestic level. International law, therefore, can, and does, play an important role in holding leaders to account - as Blair may yet find out to his cost.
In the minds of the British public (and correctly so in my view), Blair took us into an illegal war. The technical point (which I have discussed here), that he had advice from his advocate general that, given prior UK practice, our international legal obligations would be discharged if the case for war was "reasonably arguable" seems both dubious and somehow irrelevant in this regard; Blair's legal arguments are certainly, at best, shaky - and the public knows this. Has international law ever featured so prominently in an election campaign?
It may be argued that, according to the polls, Blair will still win, and win quite comfortably (although the latest suggest that enough are still undecided to make the result closer than many are predicting). However, to infer from this that the international legality of the Iraq war is a non-issue would be simply wrong. Such a reduction ignores both the complexities of this particular campaign, and the pathologies of the UK electoral system more generally. The first question may be - if Iraq is such a big deal, why haven't voters switched to the Tories? The answer is quite simply that the Tories were very vocal in their support for the war, and left few in any doubt that they would have acted in almost exactly the same way given the chance. Howard's recent attempts to recapture the anti-war vote, by accusing Blair of lying (an unusual tactic, even in an election campaign) has come accross more as cynical opportunism than principled politics. It should, of course, also be borne in mind that, in general, those who opposed the war were on the left of the political spectrum, and are unlikely to vote Tory in any event.
So why, then, have the Liberal Democrats, who have positioned themselves to the left of New Labour generally and who were the only major UK party to actively oppose the war (and always did so on the grounds of its illegality, rather than immorality) not seen the surge in the polls that one may expect if voters really care about Iraq? The answer lies in the pathologies of the UK system, which, as in the US, strongly favours an essentially two-party setup. The Liberal Democrats have never even been near power; and voters do not see them as a genuinely viable alternative for government. They will, of course, benefit from a protest vote, but these are always significantly less at general than at local or by-elections. Proof of this, if proof be needed, is furnished by Labour's campaign strategy of late: the latest posters, for example, proclaim 3 ways to get a Tory government: Stay at home, vote Tory, or vote Lib Dem.
Furthermore, even if Labour (and this is by no means certain) do not suffer overly at the ballot box, there can be no bdoubt that Blair himself has. The levels of trust placed in him by the electorate has plummetted, with polls now suggesting that, had Gordon Brown been leading the party into the election, another Labour landslide would be on the cards. The implication is clear: Blair, for the first time in his career, is a political liability; he is damaged goods.
Public international law, then, is, perhaps for the first time, at the absolute heart of a general election at the UK, and will have a serious impact, if not on who forms the next Government, then certainly on both the size of his majority and the length of time he will remain at the head. And this, perhaps, points to one of the strengths of international law that few of its critics recognise: it provides an (admittedly imperfect and indeterminate) focal point around which actors of many diverse views and with many divers projects can rally in critique of and opposition to the actions of the powerful. There seems little doubt that, without such a standard, domestic opposition to the Iraq War would quickly have fragmented and dissipated. This point holds both at the global level, among states and other international actors, and, in democracies at least, at the domestic level. International law, therefore, can, and does, play an important role in holding leaders to account - as Blair may yet find out to his cost.
More on the Tension between Italy and America
The Corriere della Sera, a very authoritative italian newspaper, publishes an article titled "We don't like this America", in its english section.
Wednesday, May 04, 2005
Capisce, per favore ... è difficile essere il hegemon
I love Italy. I really love Italy and I love Europe. I've lived in Italy and am heading there very, very soon to see dear friends including my co-blogger Lorenzo Zucca. I honestly cannot wait to sit down with Lorenzo and sip Chianti as we discuss our work and our lives.
But we cannot allow our love, or our rage, to blind us from the cold, complex sociological difficulties of world politics. It is this blindness that is causing the fissures between our continents.
There is a disconnect between Americans and Europeans generally that represents the root of most of the cultural and political difficulties that have arisen since the end of the Cold War. Robert Kagan summarizes this differential as such: "Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace."
The disconnect between Americans and Europeans is that the Kantian world cannot exist without a Hobbesian protector, nor is the Hobbesian protector as effective without counterbalancing Kantian proponents. Kant's world of perpetual peace was fraught with the dangers of despotism and internal power monopoly. Kant's "united government" required supreme military power which, after securing its territory could, over time, terrorize its inhabitants. Europe has been able to enjoy the fruits of a post-modern peace by having its security guaranteed by an outside force generally uninterested in the domestic politics of the European sphere. The guarantor is, of course, the United States.
Europe's payment for security? Open markets and access to capital. The U.S. capitalistic machine clearly cannot function entirely within its own borders, nor by relying on developing markets in Asia and elsewhere. Europe provides an outlet for goods services and a source of importation for many of the goods desired by U.S. consumers. All of this has enhanced U.S. quality of life as well as substantial benefits to European citizenry. The U.S. focus on military prowess enabled the historically instable European continent to forgo military efficiency. In fact, it precluded it, because any one of the single nations matching spending with the U.S. would be unwise. It also enabled (and spurred) closer cooperation within the context of the European Union to the point where a viable European Constitution is now up for a vote.
I feel that many in Europe believe that the hypercriticism of U.S. actions is a product of the Bush administration, but this is not borne out by the facts. When Europeans look back upon the Clinton administration with great nostalgia they ignore two things: (1) intense criticiscm of the U.S. was already present in most European countries; and (2) Clinton's differences with Bush in matters of European relations and international law was more a matter of style over substance.
The U.S. views its world as one fraught with dangers and that, while it makes mistakes, it is exhausted with being run over the coals with each one. Such results may be the destiny of the world hegemon, but it does not inspire good relations. While the U.S. should be unanimously critiqued for its poor style in dealing with its European allies, these same European powers suffer the same political grandstanding in their own domestic spheres.
So where does this leave us? Probably in the same place we began. Europe and the U.S. need the state equivalent of marriage counseling. It's clear that we're both in this for the long haul, if only we can communicate and as Bill would say "feel each other's pain."
But we cannot allow our love, or our rage, to blind us from the cold, complex sociological difficulties of world politics. It is this blindness that is causing the fissures between our continents.
There is a disconnect between Americans and Europeans generally that represents the root of most of the cultural and political difficulties that have arisen since the end of the Cold War. Robert Kagan summarizes this differential as such: "Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace."
The disconnect between Americans and Europeans is that the Kantian world cannot exist without a Hobbesian protector, nor is the Hobbesian protector as effective without counterbalancing Kantian proponents. Kant's world of perpetual peace was fraught with the dangers of despotism and internal power monopoly. Kant's "united government" required supreme military power which, after securing its territory could, over time, terrorize its inhabitants. Europe has been able to enjoy the fruits of a post-modern peace by having its security guaranteed by an outside force generally uninterested in the domestic politics of the European sphere. The guarantor is, of course, the United States.
Europe's payment for security? Open markets and access to capital. The U.S. capitalistic machine clearly cannot function entirely within its own borders, nor by relying on developing markets in Asia and elsewhere. Europe provides an outlet for goods services and a source of importation for many of the goods desired by U.S. consumers. All of this has enhanced U.S. quality of life as well as substantial benefits to European citizenry. The U.S. focus on military prowess enabled the historically instable European continent to forgo military efficiency. In fact, it precluded it, because any one of the single nations matching spending with the U.S. would be unwise. It also enabled (and spurred) closer cooperation within the context of the European Union to the point where a viable European Constitution is now up for a vote.
I feel that many in Europe believe that the hypercriticism of U.S. actions is a product of the Bush administration, but this is not borne out by the facts. When Europeans look back upon the Clinton administration with great nostalgia they ignore two things: (1) intense criticiscm of the U.S. was already present in most European countries; and (2) Clinton's differences with Bush in matters of European relations and international law was more a matter of style over substance.
The U.S. views its world as one fraught with dangers and that, while it makes mistakes, it is exhausted with being run over the coals with each one. Such results may be the destiny of the world hegemon, but it does not inspire good relations. While the U.S. should be unanimously critiqued for its poor style in dealing with its European allies, these same European powers suffer the same political grandstanding in their own domestic spheres.
So where does this leave us? Probably in the same place we began. Europe and the U.S. need the state equivalent of marriage counseling. It's clear that we're both in this for the long haul, if only we can communicate and as Bill would say "feel each other's pain."
American Murders and Italian Pride
Dear Americans,
Now you have to shut up and listen. Italians are some of your best friends. Not only because we contributed to build America, but because we continue to believe in it. Our ties go back to Cristoforo Colombo, if you see what I mean.
But now you really upset us. I am confident you upset the vast majority of italians. You managed to unite an historically (banana) split nation over one issue: the murder of Calipari.
What really went on is fairly clear by now. Mistakes have been done on both sides. Italy has not properly informed the US forces, because of your absolute opposition to paying ransoms. The US officers, on their side, showed a considerable lack of expertise. They made this accident possible, when it clearly was avoidable.
What is really upsetting is your attitude. You must accept that you do not have the monopoly of the truth; nor you have the monopoly of democracy and rule of law. There are verious way of letting democracy spring, and you do not always choose the most appropriate, let's face it.
Moreover, you must be able to understand that to be your ally is not easy. The way you treat us, and other allies, is often bully. This is wrong. You must be able to listen, and follow the advice of your friends. It is of no use to seek for our help, if you don't cherish the most important part of it: wise words of disagreement. And you must be able to accept our discontent, when you do not behave up to your standards.
Previous accidents happened. Other accidents will happen again. Of course, there was no plan to kill Calipari. But this is beside the point. You cannot deny everything and complacently attempt to justify what happened, and pronounce a self-pardon. We do not like that. It is far from the behaviour that we would expect from a country that believes to be the political leader of the world.
Leadership has its own rules. It is not because you are de facto very powerful that your action will be backed by moral authority. To the contrary, a leader should understand when it is time to give orders and when it is time to apologize and make up for tragic mistakes.
I hope you understand,
in faith LZ
Now you have to shut up and listen. Italians are some of your best friends. Not only because we contributed to build America, but because we continue to believe in it. Our ties go back to Cristoforo Colombo, if you see what I mean.
But now you really upset us. I am confident you upset the vast majority of italians. You managed to unite an historically (banana) split nation over one issue: the murder of Calipari.
What really went on is fairly clear by now. Mistakes have been done on both sides. Italy has not properly informed the US forces, because of your absolute opposition to paying ransoms. The US officers, on their side, showed a considerable lack of expertise. They made this accident possible, when it clearly was avoidable.
What is really upsetting is your attitude. You must accept that you do not have the monopoly of the truth; nor you have the monopoly of democracy and rule of law. There are verious way of letting democracy spring, and you do not always choose the most appropriate, let's face it.
Moreover, you must be able to understand that to be your ally is not easy. The way you treat us, and other allies, is often bully. This is wrong. You must be able to listen, and follow the advice of your friends. It is of no use to seek for our help, if you don't cherish the most important part of it: wise words of disagreement. And you must be able to accept our discontent, when you do not behave up to your standards.
Previous accidents happened. Other accidents will happen again. Of course, there was no plan to kill Calipari. But this is beside the point. You cannot deny everything and complacently attempt to justify what happened, and pronounce a self-pardon. We do not like that. It is far from the behaviour that we would expect from a country that believes to be the political leader of the world.
Leadership has its own rules. It is not because you are de facto very powerful that your action will be backed by moral authority. To the contrary, a leader should understand when it is time to give orders and when it is time to apologize and make up for tragic mistakes.
I hope you understand,
in faith LZ
Tuesday, May 03, 2005
Psychological Torture
A recent report by Physicians for Human Rights uncovers a substantial investigation into the systematic psychological abuse of US detainees around the world (naturally centered on the detainees at Guantanamo). I encourage everyone to check it out.
Teen Abortions and Parental Notification
For a dilemmatic case in the US, please read here
What made it all the more difficult is that the girl is under the custody of the Department of children and Families (DCF), that is supposed to do what is in the best interest of the child.
The teen, who is 13 years old, however, claims that the DCF's decision is clearly against her best interest. At her age, risks of complication are much higher in the case of a pregancy (1 out of 10.000) than in the case of an abortion (1 out of 37.000).
What made it all the more difficult is that the girl is under the custody of the Department of children and Families (DCF), that is supposed to do what is in the best interest of the child.
The teen, who is 13 years old, however, claims that the DCF's decision is clearly against her best interest. At her age, risks of complication are much higher in the case of a pregancy (1 out of 10.000) than in the case of an abortion (1 out of 37.000).
Monday, May 02, 2005
You know...just your standard "oath of loyalty" requirement.
Sometimes things are too strange for me to process.
Following my recent blog post on how if the State Department is correct that the "situation in Afghanistan" has changed and former members of the Taliban are being incorporated back into society (and thus all former Taliban should be tried for war crimes or freed), there are new reports that the U.S. "released 85 suspected Taliban from US-run detention facilitities in Afghanistan."
Two items from the report strike me:
"Before their release, the prisoners swore an oath of loyalty to the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai."
and
"The freed prisoners were given 10,000 afghani (approximately US$220) each."
So that's it? You get some detainees to say, as a military spokesperson says "they would be committed to the government and were deemed to no longer pose a threat to the government or the coalition" and you get out? Where do my clients at Guantanamo sign up?
In all seriousness, the implied requirement of an oath of loyalty to the government strikes me as a particularly strange way to decide that someone is no longer a threat to U.S. forces. I find it odd that the military didn't even try to create a facade of an orderly process (a la the Annual Review Board process at GTMO) to release these individuals.
Following my recent blog post on how if the State Department is correct that the "situation in Afghanistan" has changed and former members of the Taliban are being incorporated back into society (and thus all former Taliban should be tried for war crimes or freed), there are new reports that the U.S. "released 85 suspected Taliban from US-run detention facilitities in Afghanistan."
Two items from the report strike me:
"Before their release, the prisoners swore an oath of loyalty to the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai."
and
"The freed prisoners were given 10,000 afghani (approximately US$220) each."
So that's it? You get some detainees to say, as a military spokesperson says "they would be committed to the government and were deemed to no longer pose a threat to the government or the coalition" and you get out? Where do my clients at Guantanamo sign up?
In all seriousness, the implied requirement of an oath of loyalty to the government strikes me as a particularly strange way to decide that someone is no longer a threat to U.S. forces. I find it odd that the military didn't even try to create a facade of an orderly process (a la the Annual Review Board process at GTMO) to release these individuals.
The Rise of the European Constitution
May has brought us spring and good news on the European Constitution side. The most recent poll says that the majority of French people are now inclined to vote Yes to the Constitution on 29 may.
This is not to say that the No voters have changed their mind. To the contrary, they are fighting more and more intensively; the latest symbolic message from the No camp was sent during the first of may parade, coloured by the opposition to the European Constitution.
What has then turned the tide? The answer lies in the number of ex-undecided people. It appears that those who had not made up their mind yet, have started getting involved in the debate and have chosen to stand with the 'oui'. In particular, this seems to be the case for the voters of the socialist party. Given the fact that the polls have been run before Lionel Jospin's public intervention, it is possible that more undecided socialists will side with the Yes camp in the future.
This news needs to be welcomed as a victory as yet! Not so much for the predicted Yes -this is still very uncertain-- but more because a vast majority of the population is now becoming aware of an important european question. This will have as a result a high turn up in may, which will be a success in itself when compared to the 44% turn out in the spanish referendum in February 2005.
This is not to say that the No voters have changed their mind. To the contrary, they are fighting more and more intensively; the latest symbolic message from the No camp was sent during the first of may parade, coloured by the opposition to the European Constitution.
What has then turned the tide? The answer lies in the number of ex-undecided people. It appears that those who had not made up their mind yet, have started getting involved in the debate and have chosen to stand with the 'oui'. In particular, this seems to be the case for the voters of the socialist party. Given the fact that the polls have been run before Lionel Jospin's public intervention, it is possible that more undecided socialists will side with the Yes camp in the future.
This news needs to be welcomed as a victory as yet! Not so much for the predicted Yes -this is still very uncertain-- but more because a vast majority of the population is now becoming aware of an important european question. This will have as a result a high turn up in may, which will be a success in itself when compared to the 44% turn out in the spanish referendum in February 2005.
Sunday, May 01, 2005
Is Taft a Neocon bully?
Julian Ku at Opinio Juris rebuts recent conspiracy theories promulgated by The Guardian here that William Taft served as a Bush administration "bully" charged with changing Lord Goldsmith's opinion on the Iraq war.
I share Julian's belief that it is highly unlikely that US administration attorneys have the power to demonstrably shift the legal opinion of Lord Goldsmith. As usual, I think the likely explanation is a bit more mundane...diplomatic give and take to reach common ground on a very complex issue.
I share Julian's belief that it is highly unlikely that US administration attorneys have the power to demonstrably shift the legal opinion of Lord Goldsmith. As usual, I think the likely explanation is a bit more mundane...diplomatic give and take to reach common ground on a very complex issue.
Friday, April 29, 2005
U.S. Strongarms Bassiouni out?
Knight-Ridder is reporting that Cherif Bassiouni, formerly serving as a UN human rights investigator in Afghanistan, believes he was pushed out of his position by US officials intent on hiding individuals detained in Afghanistan and a potential transfer of about 200 Guantanamo detainees there.
In essence, Bassiouni believes that the US will try and transfer torture victims before allowing UN inspectors investigate prison conditions. This way, the government can say that it is allowing investigators while simultaneously cleansing these prisons of individuals who presumably would tell UN investigators that they were abused.
The State Department's reaction?
"We came to the conclusion that more than three years after the fall of the Taliban, the situation had evolved," a State Department spokeswoman said. "It was felt...that the special mechanism of the independent expert was no longer needed."
This peculiar response by the State Department left me wondering. First, I am uncertain as to why the fall of the Taliban government should affect a UN investigator assessing US prison conditions in Afghanistan. Second, this argument is exactly on point as to why individuals detained because they were part of the Taliban should be immediately repatriated under the Geneva Conventions.
Gosh, if the situation has changed and Afghanistan is our friend (which I believe) then why are we holding their former soldiers. Notably, these former soldiers, if not caught during the war in Afghanistan are becoming part of the very government that is now a US ally. So now we are supposed to take pride in a ideological belief that the difference between life imprisonment at GTMO and a new Afghan government job is a simple matter of timing?
The government has attempted to preclude an argument over Geneva repatriation by short-circuiting Geneva protections all together. However, the factual landscape continues to evolve in a way in which it is clear that Taliban detainees should be repatriated to Afghanistan. The more the State Department touts democratic development in Afghanistan, the less likely it is that they can argue that Taliban soldiers can be held.
If, as a March 11, 2005 article in the NY Times is correct, that the DOD's "top choice would be to win the war on terrorism and declare an end to it and repatriate everybody," then even the government is operating on a stage where repatriation at the end of hostilities is the desired result. The problem then is that the law is not dictated by the end of the war on terror but the end of hostilities in the relevant theatre of war where each detainee was captured. For example, the DoD wouldn't repatriate a Taliban POW at the end of the Iraq War, or vice versa, because they are different conflicts.
Foreign policy must possess consistency in order to gain efficacy. Inconsistent ideology spurs inconsistent action. There's no remaining logical reason for the government to continue to detain Taliban fighters at Guantanamo.
In essence, Bassiouni believes that the US will try and transfer torture victims before allowing UN inspectors investigate prison conditions. This way, the government can say that it is allowing investigators while simultaneously cleansing these prisons of individuals who presumably would tell UN investigators that they were abused.
The State Department's reaction?
"We came to the conclusion that more than three years after the fall of the Taliban, the situation had evolved," a State Department spokeswoman said. "It was felt...that the special mechanism of the independent expert was no longer needed."
This peculiar response by the State Department left me wondering. First, I am uncertain as to why the fall of the Taliban government should affect a UN investigator assessing US prison conditions in Afghanistan. Second, this argument is exactly on point as to why individuals detained because they were part of the Taliban should be immediately repatriated under the Geneva Conventions.
Gosh, if the situation has changed and Afghanistan is our friend (which I believe) then why are we holding their former soldiers. Notably, these former soldiers, if not caught during the war in Afghanistan are becoming part of the very government that is now a US ally. So now we are supposed to take pride in a ideological belief that the difference between life imprisonment at GTMO and a new Afghan government job is a simple matter of timing?
The government has attempted to preclude an argument over Geneva repatriation by short-circuiting Geneva protections all together. However, the factual landscape continues to evolve in a way in which it is clear that Taliban detainees should be repatriated to Afghanistan. The more the State Department touts democratic development in Afghanistan, the less likely it is that they can argue that Taliban soldiers can be held.
If, as a March 11, 2005 article in the NY Times is correct, that the DOD's "top choice would be to win the war on terrorism and declare an end to it and repatriate everybody," then even the government is operating on a stage where repatriation at the end of hostilities is the desired result. The problem then is that the law is not dictated by the end of the war on terror but the end of hostilities in the relevant theatre of war where each detainee was captured. For example, the DoD wouldn't repatriate a Taliban POW at the end of the Iraq War, or vice versa, because they are different conflicts.
Foreign policy must possess consistency in order to gain efficacy. Inconsistent ideology spurs inconsistent action. There's no remaining logical reason for the government to continue to detain Taliban fighters at Guantanamo.
Italian Constitutional Court and Offences to Catholic Religion
The Italian Constitutional Court quashed part of art.403 of the penal code, which stipulates sanctions for offenders of catholic religion. The argument on which this decision is grounded is that the penal code cannot make sanctions against catholic religion any bigger than sanctions against any other religion (To the present day, this was the case as art 406 of the penal code stipulates lesser sanctions, for offenders of other religions). The court based its decision on the twin action of the principles of freedom of religion and non-discrimination.
Thursday, April 28, 2005
A First Reaction to the Goldsmith Briefing
Tony Blair’s lengthy battle to keep secret the legal advice he received from the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, on the legality of any military action in Iraq failed yesterday, when significant sections of the briefing were leaked to Channel 4 News. The Government has since published the entire report, available in full here, or in summary here.
Naturally, the timing of the leak – with the general election only a week away – could not have been much worse from Blair’s point of view, particularly given that Michael Howard, the Conservative leader, had already taken the unusual step of publicly denouncing him as a “liar”. This, of course, ensures that Iraq will be at the very forefront of voters’ minds at the crucial time – the last thing that Blair would have wanted.
But what does the advice say? It covers some arguments in considerable detail, and leaves others basically unexamined. The most striking example of the latter is Lord Goldsmith’s failure to engage in any real way with the controversy over the “revival” argument: that is, that the authorisation for the use of force provided by Security Council Resolution 678 in 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, lay dormant after the ceasefire, but could be revived by a “material breach” of the ceasefire agreement. Lord Goldsmith notes that this argument had been used by his predecessors in order to justify subsequent military operations in Iraq, such as operation Desert Fox in 1998, and, despite acknowledging that it received little support in academic circles, states simply that he agrees with the advice of his predecessors. In effect, then, one of the major controversies over the legality of the action receives relatively little attention in the briefing.
Having thus “established” that the initial authorisation for the use of force ion 1990 could be revived, Lord Goldsmith then turns to the question of under what circumstances (and in particular the circumstances created by Resolution 1441) this could happen. The question, of course, was whether that resolution required another to be passed before the use of force could be viewed as authorised. Goldsmith traces both arguments (focusing more strongly, however, on the “no new resolution” approach) and finds (perhaps predictably) that both interpretations are reasonable and plausible. The crux of the matter seems to rest upon the significance given to operative paragraph 12 of the Resolution, in which it is stated that the Council must meet “to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security.” Goldsmith notes that the difference between the terms “consider” and “decide” is highly significant – particularly given the fact that the Americans had rejected French and Russian proposals that would have expressly required a further decision, “precisely to avoid being tied to the need to obtain a second resolution”.
This argument, however, must be treated with caution. At first glance, it seems significant – dispositive, even – that the French were aware that the US would not agree to a resolution that required a second one before force could be used. However, this speaks more to the indeterminacy of these kinds of texts than to any convioncing argument: although Lord Goldsmith chooses not to do so, it seems equally clear that both the French and the Russians were deeply opposed to any resolution that would allow war without a second resolution. The issue, it seems, was simply fudged; and this argument therefore strikes me as something of a dead-end. Certainly, as Lord Goldsmith notes, any court would have difficulty in upholding his conclusions, as the background negotiations on which he relies were, for the most part, conducted in private, and no official record of them exists. In essence, he is forced into a reliance on the bona fides of the US officials when they insist that the French “knew what they were voting for” in resolution 1441, and that it didn’t involve a second resolution.
Another crucial point for Lord Goldsmith is, if there has to be a new determination of material breach by Iraq after its “final opportunity”, then consistent UK practice would imply that it should be the Security Council as a whole, not individual members, that should make that determination. He notes that the UK position on this was radically different from that of the US, who had always argued that a material breach was a matter of “objective fact”, that could be recognised by any member individually. It is therefore not entirely honest to argue, as one journalist in the Guardian has done today, that “the attorney told the PM that it was for the UN security council, not him, to decide whether Iraq was complying with UN resolutions on disarmament or not. Yet we know it was the PM who took that decision.” Indeed, this has been one of the sections seized upon by Blair’s critics in the press. The relevant section from the briefing is as follows:
A key question is whether there is in truth a need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
This, of course, is not quite the same thing. Lord Goldsmith effectively states that both arguments can be reasonably and plausibly made; and, in an intriguing passage, he goes on to note that:
In reaching my conclusions, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with this view.
I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do require a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained.
This is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can really in no sensible way be taken as the clear and unequivocal advice that the war was legal that Blair claimed he had, and that formed the basis for the Cabinet decision to resort to military action. It is also, however, of importance to note that, as a matter of UK practice, even for something as fundamental as a decision to go to war, a finding that a legal case for the use of force is “reasonably arguable” is viewed as sufficient to discharge our international legal responsibilities, even though, as the last sentence quoted above seems to imply, a court would be more likely to reject that argument and find the action illegal.
Lord Goldsmith’s conclusion, then, is that it would be “safer” to seek a second resolution, in particular one that could make a definitive finding of new material breach of the previous resolutions:
In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has conduced that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.
Given what was said about the need for the case to be merely “reasonably arguable”, quoted above, the advice received by Blair was that war in Iraq would be legal (or, at least, in keeping with consistent UK practice on the matter of international legality and the use of force). This, however, does not mean that Blair is in some sense “off the hook”. The memo itself adds little or nothing new to the debate over the whether or not the war was legal; and nor was it expected to. Instead, the real question, as with so much of the current debate in the UK over Iraq, centres on Blair’s presentation of it, both to the public and to his own cabinet. By the time the cabinet met to discuss the prospect of going to war, Lord Goldsmith had radically revised his opinion, and presented a “summary” of the secret briefing that had all of the uncertainties and angst removed. Furthermore, Lord Goldsmith’s insistence on the need for “hard evidence” of material breach will not play well with voters now, given the fact that even the Government has acknowledged that such evidence simply didn’t exist. The strength with which this point is made in the summary of the briefing is worth noting:
However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider extremely carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
This will provide an uncomfortable reminder for Blair of the farce that was his Government’s “dossier” on Iraq’s WMD, which purported to provide us with just such evidence, but which in fact turned out to be little more than a cut-and-paste of a ten-year-old doctoral thesis, plagiarised, it is said, right down to the misplaced commas. It is not, therefore, in terms of the debate over the actual legality of the war that the publication of this advice has its significance, but rather with the possibility of public trust in a leader standing for re-election in just over a week’s time.
By way of conclusion, I’d just like to flag one or two other, miscellaneous points that struck me as interesting on the first, quick reading of the briefing. Firstly, Lord Goldsmith begins by acknowledging three grounds for the legitimate use of force: self-defence, Chapter VII Security Council Authorisation, and “exceptionally” (and “controversially”) action “to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe”. More support for proponents of a right to “humanitarian intervention” – he goes so far as to note that this doctrine “was relied on by the UK in the Kosovo crisis and is the underlying justification for the No-Fly Zones.”
Secondly, complete rejection of the so-called “Bush doctrine” of pre-emptive war. The relevant passage is where he notes “I am aware that the USA has been arguing for recognition of a broad doctrine of a right to use force to pre-empt danger in the future. If this means more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent attack (and I understand that the doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognised in international law.”
Lastly, on regime change. Lord Goldsmith concludes his advice with a reminder of the requirement of proportionality, noting that, even if Resolution 1441 was alone sufficient to revive the authorisation in Resolution 678, any force used must be proportionate to the legitimate objectives in order to be legal. The force thus:
- must have as its objective the enforcement the terms of the cease-fire contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions;
- be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and
- must be a proportionate response to that objective, i.e. securing compliance with Iraq's disarmament obligations.
He concludes by noting that regime change could be legal “if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action.” Again, given the now widely-acknowledged fact that Iraq had no WMD to disarm, it is this kind of statement that may come back to haunt Blair. At the very least, it allows us to track the shifting justifications used in terms of the war: initially WMD, then, when the truth about their absence began to emerge, a refocusing on humanitarian concerns and on regime change itself as a legitimate objective. It is also interesting to note that, in the same breath as acknowledging humanitarian intervention as a legitimate basis for the use of force, Lord Goldsmith adds that “know of no reason why it would be an appropriate basis for action in present circumstances.” Therefore, while the “reasonably arguable” condition for legality would seem to absolve Blair from any suggestion that he acted contrary to legal advice, or in full knowledge that the war was illegal, there is still more than enough in this briefing to deeply embarrass him; and rightly so. Certainly, his political opponents will ensure he is not allowed to ignore it in the next week or so.
Naturally, the timing of the leak – with the general election only a week away – could not have been much worse from Blair’s point of view, particularly given that Michael Howard, the Conservative leader, had already taken the unusual step of publicly denouncing him as a “liar”. This, of course, ensures that Iraq will be at the very forefront of voters’ minds at the crucial time – the last thing that Blair would have wanted.
But what does the advice say? It covers some arguments in considerable detail, and leaves others basically unexamined. The most striking example of the latter is Lord Goldsmith’s failure to engage in any real way with the controversy over the “revival” argument: that is, that the authorisation for the use of force provided by Security Council Resolution 678 in 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, lay dormant after the ceasefire, but could be revived by a “material breach” of the ceasefire agreement. Lord Goldsmith notes that this argument had been used by his predecessors in order to justify subsequent military operations in Iraq, such as operation Desert Fox in 1998, and, despite acknowledging that it received little support in academic circles, states simply that he agrees with the advice of his predecessors. In effect, then, one of the major controversies over the legality of the action receives relatively little attention in the briefing.
Having thus “established” that the initial authorisation for the use of force ion 1990 could be revived, Lord Goldsmith then turns to the question of under what circumstances (and in particular the circumstances created by Resolution 1441) this could happen. The question, of course, was whether that resolution required another to be passed before the use of force could be viewed as authorised. Goldsmith traces both arguments (focusing more strongly, however, on the “no new resolution” approach) and finds (perhaps predictably) that both interpretations are reasonable and plausible. The crux of the matter seems to rest upon the significance given to operative paragraph 12 of the Resolution, in which it is stated that the Council must meet “to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security.” Goldsmith notes that the difference between the terms “consider” and “decide” is highly significant – particularly given the fact that the Americans had rejected French and Russian proposals that would have expressly required a further decision, “precisely to avoid being tied to the need to obtain a second resolution”.
This argument, however, must be treated with caution. At first glance, it seems significant – dispositive, even – that the French were aware that the US would not agree to a resolution that required a second one before force could be used. However, this speaks more to the indeterminacy of these kinds of texts than to any convioncing argument: although Lord Goldsmith chooses not to do so, it seems equally clear that both the French and the Russians were deeply opposed to any resolution that would allow war without a second resolution. The issue, it seems, was simply fudged; and this argument therefore strikes me as something of a dead-end. Certainly, as Lord Goldsmith notes, any court would have difficulty in upholding his conclusions, as the background negotiations on which he relies were, for the most part, conducted in private, and no official record of them exists. In essence, he is forced into a reliance on the bona fides of the US officials when they insist that the French “knew what they were voting for” in resolution 1441, and that it didn’t involve a second resolution.
Another crucial point for Lord Goldsmith is, if there has to be a new determination of material breach by Iraq after its “final opportunity”, then consistent UK practice would imply that it should be the Security Council as a whole, not individual members, that should make that determination. He notes that the UK position on this was radically different from that of the US, who had always argued that a material breach was a matter of “objective fact”, that could be recognised by any member individually. It is therefore not entirely honest to argue, as one journalist in the Guardian has done today, that “the attorney told the PM that it was for the UN security council, not him, to decide whether Iraq was complying with UN resolutions on disarmament or not. Yet we know it was the PM who took that decision.” Indeed, this has been one of the sections seized upon by Blair’s critics in the press. The relevant section from the briefing is as follows:
A key question is whether there is in truth a need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
This, of course, is not quite the same thing. Lord Goldsmith effectively states that both arguments can be reasonably and plausibly made; and, in an intriguing passage, he goes on to note that:
In reaching my conclusions, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with this view.
I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do require a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained.
This is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can really in no sensible way be taken as the clear and unequivocal advice that the war was legal that Blair claimed he had, and that formed the basis for the Cabinet decision to resort to military action. It is also, however, of importance to note that, as a matter of UK practice, even for something as fundamental as a decision to go to war, a finding that a legal case for the use of force is “reasonably arguable” is viewed as sufficient to discharge our international legal responsibilities, even though, as the last sentence quoted above seems to imply, a court would be more likely to reject that argument and find the action illegal.
Lord Goldsmith’s conclusion, then, is that it would be “safer” to seek a second resolution, in particular one that could make a definitive finding of new material breach of the previous resolutions:
In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has conduced that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.
Given what was said about the need for the case to be merely “reasonably arguable”, quoted above, the advice received by Blair was that war in Iraq would be legal (or, at least, in keeping with consistent UK practice on the matter of international legality and the use of force). This, however, does not mean that Blair is in some sense “off the hook”. The memo itself adds little or nothing new to the debate over the whether or not the war was legal; and nor was it expected to. Instead, the real question, as with so much of the current debate in the UK over Iraq, centres on Blair’s presentation of it, both to the public and to his own cabinet. By the time the cabinet met to discuss the prospect of going to war, Lord Goldsmith had radically revised his opinion, and presented a “summary” of the secret briefing that had all of the uncertainties and angst removed. Furthermore, Lord Goldsmith’s insistence on the need for “hard evidence” of material breach will not play well with voters now, given the fact that even the Government has acknowledged that such evidence simply didn’t exist. The strength with which this point is made in the summary of the briefing is worth noting:
However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider extremely carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
This will provide an uncomfortable reminder for Blair of the farce that was his Government’s “dossier” on Iraq’s WMD, which purported to provide us with just such evidence, but which in fact turned out to be little more than a cut-and-paste of a ten-year-old doctoral thesis, plagiarised, it is said, right down to the misplaced commas. It is not, therefore, in terms of the debate over the actual legality of the war that the publication of this advice has its significance, but rather with the possibility of public trust in a leader standing for re-election in just over a week’s time.
By way of conclusion, I’d just like to flag one or two other, miscellaneous points that struck me as interesting on the first, quick reading of the briefing. Firstly, Lord Goldsmith begins by acknowledging three grounds for the legitimate use of force: self-defence, Chapter VII Security Council Authorisation, and “exceptionally” (and “controversially”) action “to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe”. More support for proponents of a right to “humanitarian intervention” – he goes so far as to note that this doctrine “was relied on by the UK in the Kosovo crisis and is the underlying justification for the No-Fly Zones.”
Secondly, complete rejection of the so-called “Bush doctrine” of pre-emptive war. The relevant passage is where he notes “I am aware that the USA has been arguing for recognition of a broad doctrine of a right to use force to pre-empt danger in the future. If this means more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent attack (and I understand that the doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognised in international law.”
Lastly, on regime change. Lord Goldsmith concludes his advice with a reminder of the requirement of proportionality, noting that, even if Resolution 1441 was alone sufficient to revive the authorisation in Resolution 678, any force used must be proportionate to the legitimate objectives in order to be legal. The force thus:
- must have as its objective the enforcement the terms of the cease-fire contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions;
- be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and
- must be a proportionate response to that objective, i.e. securing compliance with Iraq's disarmament obligations.
He concludes by noting that regime change could be legal “if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action.” Again, given the now widely-acknowledged fact that Iraq had no WMD to disarm, it is this kind of statement that may come back to haunt Blair. At the very least, it allows us to track the shifting justifications used in terms of the war: initially WMD, then, when the truth about their absence began to emerge, a refocusing on humanitarian concerns and on regime change itself as a legitimate objective. It is also interesting to note that, in the same breath as acknowledging humanitarian intervention as a legitimate basis for the use of force, Lord Goldsmith adds that “know of no reason why it would be an appropriate basis for action in present circumstances.” Therefore, while the “reasonably arguable” condition for legality would seem to absolve Blair from any suggestion that he acted contrary to legal advice, or in full knowledge that the war was illegal, there is still more than enough in this briefing to deeply embarrass him; and rightly so. Certainly, his political opponents will ensure he is not allowed to ignore it in the next week or so.
Protest politics and responsibility towards the citizens and the future
Lorenzo wrote about the very interesting position of the ex-French Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who invited the French people to vote for the European Constitution and accused parts of the politically affiliated and non-affiliated left who propagate the “no” vote. As far as they are concerned he said, "Nous ne pouvons dépendre ni doctrinalement, ni stratégiquement de ceux qui refusent le pouvoir".
In English, “We cannot depend nor strategically nor doctrinally on those who renounce power”.
This is the essence of the very credible critique of the radical left civil society movements and their way of doing politics. Especially those that do not pretend to take power but participate in politics only to, so to speak, deconstruct, not to construct. This is largely because their political platform rests on maximalist aims completely unaware of political realities (this is completely besides the point that we might find the underlying ideas of that platform morally credible: e.g. solidarity, economic equality argument, pacifism etc.). The political position of these movements rests on a definition of politics as art of the impossible rather than art of the possible.
I am not necessarily condemning making politics as art of the impossible neither suggesting that the only way to do politics in a kind of Metternich’s, Kissinger’s Realpolitik, however, I think that they are times when it is responsible to do so and times when it is not. Or better, that the only time when the politics of deconstruction is ‘allowed’, so to speak, is when it clearly ,and with no doubt, simultaneously constructs. What do I mean? Let me explain this through an example.
A couple of years ago the French rap band called Zebda (excellent band by the way, Raphael recommended that I should listen to them in 2001, and I do ever since then) participated in the local elections in the South-West town of Toulouse as a clear beneficiary of the left wing protest vote, they managed to gather 12.38% of the vote in the first round of the lections. The Socialist candidate got less than the right wing candidate, and in order to win, the Socialists badly needed the votes of the Greens, Politically Affiliated extreme left, but more than them of the “Zebda List” . Without the Zebda votes the right wing candidate for Mayor would have won. Most of the people who voted for Zebda, voted for them as a form of protest, to express their disappointment with the main stream Socialist politics, but also with the political message of radical-left wing parties.
Before the second round of the elections Zebda guys invited their voters to vote Socialist, but more importantly they admitted that they would not be able anyways to run a municipality, this announcement was accompanied by humorous scenes such as dancing of the gray-haired socialist politicians at the Zebda music. The Socialist Candidate, at the end of the day won. Thanks to Zebda voters.
What is my point. Fair enough, Zebda’s direct participation in the elections can be branded as politically irresponsible because they had no clear agenda of what they want to do if they come to power (my word! they even admitted that they are completely incapable of running a municipality), but I do not think that what they did was irresponsible. Their participation made a clear signal to the Socialist mayor, to put it bluntly, to keep to the left when managing the city. The protest vote for them was indeed deconstructive, but a form of deconstruction that constructs.
In the case of the Referendum voting for the EU Constitution we can only vote “yes” or “no”, like in the case of Zebda, we send a strong and clear message, an electroshock, that we do not want such Constitution. Yet, there is a clear difference between the two cases. In the case of the EU Constitution the next chance is not in 14 days, like in the case of French municipal elections (between the first and the second round), but God knows when. And as Lorenzo points out, “But the Constitution may look worse than it was in the first place.” And, I would add, it will certainly not look better (meeting the interests fo the French “no” voters). The new version of the Constitution, thought by the lesson of the French electroschock, will certainly not include clauses that would appease the French left wing supporters of the “no”, but more probably, if the new version of the constitution is ever presented to the EU Member State voters, it would look to moderatly appease the right wing that votes “no”, thus possibly, include Christian values in the Preamble of the EU Constitution etc.
(next week I will contemplate on the possible outcomes of the French “no” vote)
In English, “We cannot depend nor strategically nor doctrinally on those who renounce power”.
This is the essence of the very credible critique of the radical left civil society movements and their way of doing politics. Especially those that do not pretend to take power but participate in politics only to, so to speak, deconstruct, not to construct. This is largely because their political platform rests on maximalist aims completely unaware of political realities (this is completely besides the point that we might find the underlying ideas of that platform morally credible: e.g. solidarity, economic equality argument, pacifism etc.). The political position of these movements rests on a definition of politics as art of the impossible rather than art of the possible.
I am not necessarily condemning making politics as art of the impossible neither suggesting that the only way to do politics in a kind of Metternich’s, Kissinger’s Realpolitik, however, I think that they are times when it is responsible to do so and times when it is not. Or better, that the only time when the politics of deconstruction is ‘allowed’, so to speak, is when it clearly ,and with no doubt, simultaneously constructs. What do I mean? Let me explain this through an example.
A couple of years ago the French rap band called Zebda (excellent band by the way, Raphael recommended that I should listen to them in 2001, and I do ever since then) participated in the local elections in the South-West town of Toulouse as a clear beneficiary of the left wing protest vote, they managed to gather 12.38% of the vote in the first round of the lections. The Socialist candidate got less than the right wing candidate, and in order to win, the Socialists badly needed the votes of the Greens, Politically Affiliated extreme left, but more than them of the “Zebda List” . Without the Zebda votes the right wing candidate for Mayor would have won. Most of the people who voted for Zebda, voted for them as a form of protest, to express their disappointment with the main stream Socialist politics, but also with the political message of radical-left wing parties.
Before the second round of the elections Zebda guys invited their voters to vote Socialist, but more importantly they admitted that they would not be able anyways to run a municipality, this announcement was accompanied by humorous scenes such as dancing of the gray-haired socialist politicians at the Zebda music. The Socialist Candidate, at the end of the day won. Thanks to Zebda voters.
What is my point. Fair enough, Zebda’s direct participation in the elections can be branded as politically irresponsible because they had no clear agenda of what they want to do if they come to power (my word! they even admitted that they are completely incapable of running a municipality), but I do not think that what they did was irresponsible. Their participation made a clear signal to the Socialist mayor, to put it bluntly, to keep to the left when managing the city. The protest vote for them was indeed deconstructive, but a form of deconstruction that constructs.
In the case of the Referendum voting for the EU Constitution we can only vote “yes” or “no”, like in the case of Zebda, we send a strong and clear message, an electroshock, that we do not want such Constitution. Yet, there is a clear difference between the two cases. In the case of the EU Constitution the next chance is not in 14 days, like in the case of French municipal elections (between the first and the second round), but God knows when. And as Lorenzo points out, “But the Constitution may look worse than it was in the first place.” And, I would add, it will certainly not look better (meeting the interests fo the French “no” voters). The new version of the Constitution, thought by the lesson of the French electroschock, will certainly not include clauses that would appease the French left wing supporters of the “no”, but more probably, if the new version of the constitution is ever presented to the EU Member State voters, it would look to moderatly appease the right wing that votes “no”, thus possibly, include Christian values in the Preamble of the EU Constitution etc.
(next week I will contemplate on the possible outcomes of the French “no” vote)
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