Sunday, May 06, 2007
Sarkozy Wins.
French Elections: A Preamble
The present past saw a clear decline in social and economic terms. Social conflicts in France is under the eyes of everyone, although people started acknowledging it only recently. I still remember 1998, when France won the World Cup. Many French friends of mine used that as an example of perfect integration of immigrants a la francaise. I thought back then, and I still think, that the french republican model of integration dramatically failed, despite its good will. A republican model means for French mainstream ideology a value monist system of values based on French Constitutional history since 1789. Multiculturalism, and value pluralism, have always been rejected as impracticable and 'anti-french.' In other words, living in France required people to become French; no alternative was/is possible. This situation needs to be radically reformed.
The more remote past concerns the institutions that moulded the French Nation in the past two centuries. Elite institutions as the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole Normale and all the bodies of the state that go with them are in need of a deep reform as well. Those institutions had an extraordinary success during the age of nations, more or less up to WW2 and few decades after that. Globalisation, however, showed the intrinsic limits of institutions that work within a rigid (french) republican mould. The inability to compete with other institutions in the world is becoming staggering and the only option left is the overhaul of the whole system.
It is unclear whether Segolene or Sarkozy will manage to push forward these massive changes. There is no easy recepee to bring France out of the present stagnation. Perhaps something can be learned from Tony Blair's bitter sweet (more bitter than sweet) rule. He acknowledges nowadays that the greatest battle was the one for the change of attitudes of people ( a cultural change in relation to the way of doing politics in a completely different international landscape). French people are at the moment skeptical, afraid of globalisation, incapable of competing on a wider scale than the national one, and tired of the old Chiral like type of politics. May the next President achieve the difficult mission of change!
Tuesday, April 24, 2007
French Elections: a short exchange
Hello boys. Sorry to disagree Lorenzo. So far Bayrou has done close to nothing for a simple reason. His score is due to the rejection of Royal, by typical socialist voters, and of Sarkozy, by typical UMP voters. There fore his success seems very much linked to a punctual situation ; and if either Sarkozy or Royal leave the spotlight after the elections, things should get back to normal with an UDF around 10%. During the weeks prior to the elections, some of his closest advisors (J-L Bourlanges in this case) said they were very afraid that if Bayrou was not second or third, the political force which he represents would be wiped clean during the legislative elections. In the past, they were able to gain many seats in Parliament thanks to the agreements they had with the UMP (hence the choice of several leaders from the UDF to fallow Sarkozy rather that Bayrou who will probably be less able to preserve their positions of power). Having heard that several times, I was very surprised to see how happy Bayrou seemed yesterday night. I can't help thinking that it isn't authentic happiness. If he doesn't show that he believes he can create a new movement, no one will. He had no other choice than to pretend he was really satisfied with the result; he’s trying to start a movement, he can’t look depressed.All night yesterday and all day today, I've hearing politicians, journalists and scholars say how great it is for democracy that Sarkozy was able to win back votes that went to Le Pen in previous elections. I think that, the very fact people don't see what is wrong with that shows what kind of a problem we have on our hands. The way Sarkozy was able to appeal to these voters was by picking up Le Pen's discourse, using his words, his images and often his very expressions. Worst, parts of his program are inspired by Le Pen’s, so the similarity isn’t only formal – substantially, their views of society, authority, foreigners, national identity are close. Sarkozy doesn't say the contrary, Le Pen certainly recognizes it. So what has happened? Words and ideas which were before called "racist", "dangerous", "intolerant" are now called "democratic". Somehow it has now become acceptable to defend Le Pen's ideas. Thank you Sarkozy indeed! The fact that his overwhelming success yesterday was due to his ability to appeal to the far right, using partially the FN's racist, authoritative, violent program is a very scary thing for the future in this country.Raphaël Paour
Srdjan Cvijic said...
I agree with a number of the points you raise Raphael, esspecially those referring to Sarkozy swinging to the right. One must closely watch at what will he offer to Le Pen's voters to incite them to vote for him, introduction of a proportional representation system at the legislative elctions possibly? However, I disagree with one point Bayrou is the king maker, if he has the courage to risk and shift in support of Royal but under the condition that she agrees to form a governing coallition after legislative elections. In this way France would follow a political process already in place in Italy, along the lines of the Blarite shift, that is transformation of the traditional left into a third way political groupaion. She would inevitably lose some votes on the far left, whether she will be elected this is a real question?
Lorenzo Zucca said...
Raph, I think that Le Pen, even if He is hardly acceptable, has concerns that are shared by many people in France. To address those problems is a way of living in a democracy: you try and capture the mood of the majority of people. Sarkozy 'stole' some of Le Pen's concerns but presented them in a way that is acceptable by French standards. Now, if you want to say that French standards of democratic discourse are low and that many people are racist and intolerant in a disguised way, I can only agree with you.My impression on Bayrou may be wrong. It's just a communicative impression. From that viewpoint, I found that Sarkozy was quite nervous, and Royal was very rigid after the result. I think they both feel that they have to do a lot to make sure that they win. Royal more than Sarkozy... I think. Bayrou has a clear strong result, which is a very strong progression from last time he run (In 2002 he had 4% or so; today he almost has 19). He is, if he wants, the Queen maker as Srdjan says. But I am not sure he wants to settle on a compromise at this moment. He would probably work on this result to have a good result at the parliamentary elections and then he will decide.
Srdjan Cvijic said...
I have to make a small clarification, strictly formally speaking no compromise between Bayrou and Royal would be even acceptable at this point, Presidential elections are direct so the president directly represents the people and not some alligment of political parties. This of course does not mean that they cannot make, however, a political agreement, implicit. Yet, the problem is in the formalistic aspect, who is to guarantee to Bayrou that Royal and PS would really support him in the legislative elections. Second, who is to guarantee that Bayrou's voters will vote for Royal or Sarkozy?
Monday, April 23, 2007
French Presidentials: The winner (for the moment) is: Bayrou
Royal and Sarkozy looked more tense. They have to look ahead and prepare for the second round in two weeks time.
I think that the second round will be more a referendum about Sarkozy than a competition between the two candidates. He's in a very good position and at this point he can only lose the contest. If for example the global turn out will be lower, but his electorate will keep on voting, this will mean that he will start with a 35/40 % basis. To reach 50 + % will not be terribly difficult.
Much will depend on what Bayrou's supporters will do. It is likely, however, that Bayrou will not take a public stance in favour of either candidate. To do so, would subsume his new political centre to either right or left, and that is precisely what he wants to avoid as his message is:
we are a 3rd fully independent force.
This will count massively in the legislative elections, which may end up giving some further surprises.
Thursday, April 19, 2007
France and Scotland Face Big Political/Constitutional Changes
Very soon, Scotland will also vote for its 'local' elections, perhaps the last. If the SNP (scottish nationalist) wins, then those elections will probably be national in the future. For an European living in Scotland this alone may be a good argument against SNP: why would we vote to lose our vote?
Gordon Brown will look at this election with great interest. If the SNP wins and Scotland goes toward independence, then its chances of becoming a strong prime minister collapse: he could not claim anymore to represent british interests. In any event, UK constitutional politics seemed geared toward a time of change!
All this may contribute to a renewal at the European Constitutional level. France may well have a new referendum on a simplified text, probably a simple Treaty. The UK will have to redesign its European politics. If England remains Euro-Skeptic, Scotland is in general quite Euro-friendly.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Chirac's Legacy
What will be his legacy? there are many sceptics on this point, the most prominent is probably the economist which had a very hard article last week. here: http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8850710
Here's a passage:
Mr Chirac's popularity rating has slumped from a second-term high of 60% during the Iraq war, according to TNS-Sofres, a polling organisation, to just 29% today. Midway through 2006, he became the most unpopular president under the French Fifth Republic since polling began.
Monday, March 12, 2007
Bye Bye Chirac
As a result 2007 will see the end of two heavyweight of European politics, Chirac and Blair, who have dominated the scene for the past 10 years or so.
We can only hope that after them, Europe and the world will be less polarized.
Sunday, February 25, 2007
French Presidential Elections: Segolene Royal
Yet, the programme she has unveiled recently is only about welfare redistribution in a very old fashion socialist style.
Economically she is nothing really new. Socially, she claims she will be tough on crime and disorder, and this reminds us of Tony Blair. But Tony is nothing new. Plus, Tony without his economic achievement is close to nothing especially if you judge by his international politics.
So, who is Segolene, and what is XXI century socialism? Unfortunately, to look for an answer to this questions may be like 'waiting for Godot.'
Saturday, February 17, 2007
French Presidential Elections: 2 Months to Go
For those who want to follow the election closely, please have a look here (in french).
Friday, March 31, 2006
Not so sure Villepin isn't a populist
In the previous post below, Lorenzo says:
"
This is Villepin's argument which Lorenzo adheres to. I find it a bit rhetorical to not say "populist". It seems that in reality things aren't so simple. First, not every one agrees with high protection = few jobs and no protection (or "lots of flexibility" as they like to put it) = lots of jobs. Also the flexibility has to be right on target and Villepin who never took time to consult with the economical actors is off the mark. Very many employers have already stated that this new contract does nothing for them.
Lorenzo is quite optimistic about Villepin when he says:
"For once, I am with Villepin, the prime minister who wants the statute so badly. In order to do so, his popularity is clearly collapsing. This is in a way a very good sign: Villepin is not a populist. Whether he's right or wrong, this is another issue."
I have some respect for Villepin; he is one of a kind with his romantic vision of politics and himself. However I have to disagree with the idea that he isn't a populist. When he came into power he said he would put the economy right back on its tracks in 100 days. That type of promise reminds me of... Berlusconi. Both these guys are desperate: they have very little time to persuade, Berlusconi because the elections are upon us and Villepin because Sarkozy 's popularity is very very high. In his race against the clock Villepin has to give all he's got. He is very disliked by the members of Parliament of his own party (he cost them their job in 1998 and was never one of them - he was always an advisor of Chirac and stepped in the political light only recently). So he said that he would change every thing in 100 days in an effort to appear even more efficient than Sarkozy. As a result of his precipitation he consulted nobody (not event the minister of labour) and pulled the CPE out of his hat. It didn't work as planned as he and his advisors never saw the student protests coming. Now he's got two possibilities: 1) he abandons the bill, 2) he sticks with it.
If he chooses solution 1) what benefit can he get out of it ? People will say: he was reasonable put he should've been more cautious in the first place and prevent the protests etc. In any case any benefit he gets out of it will never be sufficient to reach Sarkozy's level of popularity.
If he chooses solution 2) and sticks with his plan no matter what, two things can happen. a) The crisis gains in intensity (pretty soon many students will have nothing to lose as they will consider this semester to have been sacrificed...) and leads to a very problematic, probably violent situation, for which he will be held partly responsible. Or scenario b) can take place in which the protests die out during the school break in a little more than a week. The benefit he would get from this would be very important, people will say how courageous he is, how he's not a populist, how only he was able to reform in a country that doesn’t accept change etc. In this case, and in this case only, can he hope to supersede Sarkozy in the opinion poles in view of the next presidential elections.
So you see, if Villepin wants to be the next President of the Republic he is constrained to chose solution 2) and hope for scenario b) to happen.
I don't think it can be disputed that he indeed wants to sit on Chirac's throne. After all, he does think that France is like a pretty young and shy lady that wants to be taken by a flamboyant man such as himself (it isn't the exact citation but it goes something like that). It is no secret really that he doesn’t believe "the dwarf", as he calls Sarkozy, to be great enough for the task, and he'll do anything it takes to get in his way. Even if it means bargaining with his popularity.
Villepin may be right about the french job market..
The ball is now in the end of the President of the Republic, who has to sign the statute to make it enforceable. Needless to say, trade unions and a large chunk of the civil society is pleading against the signature.
The argument is the following: to enforce that statute would merely increase the social conflict that has plagued France for the last two months.
For once, I am with Villepin, the prime minister who wants the statute so badly. In order to do so, his popularity is clearly collapsing. This is in a way a very good sign: Villepin is not a populist. Whether he's right or wrong, this is another issue.
I personally believe that the job market is badly in need of a reform. France has to choose between a stagnant job market with a lot of protection for few people, and a more flexible market with less protection but more opportunities.
A sacrifice of some sort is needed, and the choice is not immediately clear. But given the present context of economic crisis, and gap between old and young generations, Villepin's choice is probably the best option.
Having said that, I am skeptical as to whether the statute will yield results quickly enough to make french people change opinion as to the necessity of some needed reforms. But if the reform does not work now, it will have to be much more radical in few years. Look around in Europe: Germany itself, the most powerful engine of European economic integration, is struggling with much needed reforms.
The darker side of this story is that the right wing contestant of Villepin, Mr Sarkozi, may be unduly strenghtened by the little popular initiative of Villepin.
Friday, March 24, 2006
What do the student protests in France mean ?
More than two weeks ago, the Parisian University La Sorbonne was occupied by around 200 students over 24 hours before the police was able to throw them out. The images seen on TV of police forces charging students naturally drew about parallels with the spring of 1968.
The events of that night represented the climax point of a movement which slowly started over a month ago in some French universities (
Presidents of several Universities asked the Prime Minister Villepin to change his bill and open a wide debate on the subjects of access the job-market and its relationship with higher education. Many employers of large and small companies have criticized Villepin’s reform. Progressively, High school students have joined the movements and the different marches, all over the country, which took place on three different days last week have drawn more and more participants. Next week the inter-professional Unions will join forces with the students. In the meantime the Socialist Party finally, but very cautiously, entered the battle by asking the Constitutional Council to strike down the bill. Opinion polls are showing that evryday a greater number of people want the Government to back down.
But Villepin who values holding a position against all odds, has yet to show signs of a real intension to negotiate on the crucial aspects of his policy. Frequently now the marches lead to scenes of violence with the police forces (most of the images seen on TV last week showed radical groups from the left-wing taking on the police or right-wing radicals – amongst which some football Hooligans).
The events of the past weeks, when put in perspective with Lionel Jospin’s failure to make to the second round of the Presidential election in 2002 (leading to Le Pen’s candidacy), with the rejection of the European Constitution last spring and the urban riots of last fall reveal a now salient point of the current French political scenery. While the majority of the population may still be conservative (in the sense that it votes for the right-wing parties and adheres to their ideas) a very large number of citizens (well over 15 %) who, without being radicals, are partisans of an active welfare State, have no longer any institutional means of representation. Neither labour-unions nor left-wing political parties offer a platform of ideas corresponding to the aspirations of this part of the population. Violence is the result of this. The concrete manifestations differ but the violence is always the same: voting against a Socialist government at the risk of sending a far-right candidate to the second round of the presidential elections; rejecting the Constitution at the risk of compromising a the future and the past of European construction; burning the neighbours’ cars or preventing fellow students to attend their classes.
The failure of the Socialist party to express the will of its natural voters is becoming recurrent in ordinary political life, leaving the responsibility of action to members of the social society. For example it is law professors that contested the bill on the State of Urgency, declared last fall during the riots ; associations, professors, and journalists that initiated the movement against the law relative to the “positive aspects of colonisation”.
It would be a big mistake to think that the events in the Universities concern only the students, that the riots concerned only children from the urban ghettoes (or worst only Muslims), that the rejection of the European Constitution concerned only racist anti-Europeans and members of a spoiled middle-class. The people concerned represent a large and plural part of the population. Many of the people who will no longer rely on the left-wing parties to express their ideals voted for Mitterrand, twice, and then voted for the Maastricht Treaty, the majority of this part of the population is therefore surely not composed of typical radicals. It is the current lack of political offer which makes them so. There is a striking contrast between the apathy of the left-wing political class and the ideological engagement of the population.
The type of ideological awareness of the population displayed in the last few weeks is a source of hope for any democrat. It is a great thing to see young students feeling so concerned ; not only those fighting the reform of labour law but also those in favour of this policy. Debates were organized by students and professors alike (for example the ones that took place in my University) engaging in often constructive dialogue (and unfortunately redundant violence). With its positive and its negative aspects, French Universities have become the most political places in the country, like they once were.
Friday, March 10, 2006
France: A Crisis Area?
The International Crisis Group, a worldwide think tank specializing in the area of conflict prevention, wrote a report on France and 2005 suburb riots. It is rather peculiar, but far from inappropriate, that this well-known organization concentrates on France since one of its principal goals is to concentrate on the areas of crisis in the World (most of its report is devoted to the Balkans, Caucasus, Great Lakes District in Africa etc).
In its report on France ICG argues, “France faces a problem with its Muslim population, but it is not the problem it generally assumes.” Explaining the root of the problem in France, the ICG report, repeats the established opinion that the French integration model is increasingly unable to face with the heterogeneity of the French society, however, there is more to it in this report.
Differently than many other analytical pieces that claimed that the French riots simply follow the world trend where the Muslim population is organizing in Islamic political parties and groups and that the problem lies in such political organization, ICG report argues that the problem is not in “the threat of a Muslim world mobilised by political Islamism” but in the lack of political mobilisation and activism of the French youth from the suburbs. ICG report states, “Yet the opposite is true: paradoxically, it is the exhaustion of political Islamism, not its radicalisation, that explains much of the violence, and it is the depoliticisation of young Muslims, rather than their alleged reversion to a radical kind of communalism, that ought to be cause for worry. “
The Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF) gradually abandoned its strategy of political opposition and was slowly involved into the mainstream, this meant increased clientelism and decreased legitimation among the Muslim population, argues the ICG report. The political vacuum was filled by the Salafist movement that called for concentration on religion and so to speak abandonment of politics. French Muslims were left, says the ICG report, with Salafist Jihadism and uncoordinated riots.
In order to overcome this situation ICG came out with several recommendations:
The French government should, “Reduce the state’s coercive presence in underprivileged neighbourhoods” and “reduce social discrimination” as well as Reform the modes of political representation of the Muslim population, and in particular, abandon the idea that institutionalising Islam as a religion will thwart the jihadist temptation etc. The French government should do its best to “Revitalise the associational movement”. As far as other actors are concerned, ICG thinks that National Political Forces must strengthen their presence in underprivileged suburban neighbourhoods, Activists of the Immigrant Communities and of Underprivileged Neighbourhoods should increase opportunities for young Muslims to be active and mobilised through political parties and local associations, as a means of competing with the salafi and jihadi trends.
The 'French report' makes one think that it would be more than welcome if ICG concentrated on other parts of the liberal democratic world which are themselves not immune to crisis and that have the potentiality, if not monitored, to decrease the level of political stability of the Democratic World and, as a consequence, lead to a period of global turmoil. Many of the liberal democratic countries demonstrate a worrying inability of the state to control and countenance social and natural processes and the involvement of international think thanks such as ICG might help improve the situation and appropriately focalize the state's response to crisis. The world in which we live is still relatively speaking 'safe', which does not mean that it is to remain such in the years to come. In order to control the negative political processes within nation states involvement of international non-governmental and non-profit organizations such as ICG can help. It would be interesting to see the reaction of the French government to this report.
Tuesday, May 31, 2005
The Truth behind (the French) Tragedy
The nation state par excellence, has decreed its suicide on 29th of May by voting No to the European Constitution. The French people expressed a strong degree of dissatisfaction towards its political class, the high level of unemployment, the French Constitution, and many other things. It is difficult to disentangle them all, but I will at least point to a few of them.
Chirac is the great loser. He threw all his political weight behind the Constitution. He appeared on television several times. Nevertheless, he suffered a great defeat. His putative father, Charles de Gaulle, would have resigned after acknowledging such a defeat. Chirac is there to stay, it is the only thing he can do if he wants to avoid being jailed. By voting No, however, the French people do not get rid of Jacques Chirac.
The French ruling class. It is fragmented and weak, it is not able to agree on fundamental issues such as the european constitution. France is broken into two halves. The elite who preaches modernity and grandeur. The people who rejects everthing coming from the top. Communication is impossible. By voting no, the French people has just confirmed the conviction of the elite that the people should not decide. Sad, but french.
French unemployment. The French economic model does not work. France has the highest unemployment rate, and it is very natural that unemployed people wanted to sanction their government. The plain fact of high unemployment raises the question whether the french welfare system is viable. I think it is not. It is much more in line with the principle of equality to have less unemployment with less social privileges, than more unemployed with more social privileges. By voting No, the French people entrenched the status quo of unemployment and stagnation. Good for them.
The French Constitution. Yes indeed, the French Constitution of 1958 is equally under fire. The presidential systems with an untouchable president is not desirable. The french people said No to Chirac primarily. They only get rid of Raffarin, the prime minister. This, of course, is not sufficient. By voting no, french people only get what they deserve: a new, weak, right wing government.
The end of Solidarity . France is terrorized: Polish workers, africans, muslims, turkish.. They are all perceived as threats. The threats Mr LePen has talked about for so very long; the threats that have seduced all those who voted for the no to the European constitution.
In conclusion, Egalite', Liberte', and Fraternite' do not live in France anymore. They leave in Europe, in the hopes of those who want to construe a courageous Europe. One that does not fear modern challenges. The call for more justice is coming from central and eastern europe. They want to disenfranchise themselves from the dark communist past. Ukraine was one instance of the call for freedom and justice. There are more to come. And all the courageous Europeans will be there to welcome this call for freedom and justice, and support it through our solidarity. France can rest for today, because tomorrow it will have to face the burden of the darkest decadence since the French revolution.
Monday, May 30, 2005
Europe on hold...
Analysis of the possible fall-out from this decision has already begun (see here, here and here; and, for a view from the other side of the Atlantic, see the posts from the Opino Juris blog here and here); however, it remains far too early to say much with any certainty. It seems likely that much of the responsibility for cleaning up the mess will fall on Blair, as the UK is due to take over the presidency of the EU in July. Although he will be relieved that he will almost certainly not have to lead the probably futile campaign for a "yes" vote in the UK - upon which, many believed, the future of his premiership hinged - he will not relish the prospect of being the man of the moment in what promises to be one of the most significant crises to afflict the EU since it began. At the very least, it means that his priorities of economic reform of the Union will be pushed very far down the agenda, if not off it altogether.
What might this "no" mean? In many respects, this is a misleading question, as, as has been noted here in various previous posts on the subject, those in favour of rejection in France came from wildly different ends of the political spectrum. Some arguments we can dismiss out of hand: for example, Socialist Henri Emmanuelli's claim that the vote would lead to a new, "socialist Europe" seems to display an almost outrageous and utterly unfounded optimism, given that the fragmented French left has not been able to secure much of a socialist France - and that the "no" vote relied just as heavily on the reactionary, nationalist right as it did on the socialist left.
Some themes did seem to be common, however, not the least of which was that the Consitution was "Blairiste", overly-favouring free-market economic policies at the percieved expense of many French national interests. It is most interesting in this regard that all eyes seem to be on Chirac, and how he will play this issue. Will he seek to shore up his own crumbling popularity domestically by opportunistically repositioning himself in line with public discontent by blaiming Britain, and Blair, for the nature of the Constitution? Or will he seek to deflect attention from himself by sacking the unpopular prime minister Raffarin and replacing him with the far more popular (and populist) Sarkozy (who, incidentally, would move things in a direction much more in tune with Blair's own)?
One thing is certain: the populations of Europe are deeply, deeply divided over the direction the Union should take, and over which states should play the leading roles, both internally and externally. The French appear to have rejected the Consitution, in significant part at least, because they viewed it as overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon; a Constitution, remember, that UK public opinion also was overwhelmingly opposed to. This alone does not bode well for a speedy, secure resolution of the crisis in the foreseeable future; add to the mix another 23 countries, all with their own agendas, not to mention continuing - indeed, deepening - rifts over issues such as the UK's budget rebate and the propsed accession of Turkey - and the situation looks ever more grim. We are, it seems, living in interesting times.
Friday, May 06, 2005
EU Constitution against « La République, une et indivisible » and laïcité
At the time of the French Revolution, when this principle was introduced it was considered as presenting a break with traditional society of the ancien regime, a system that knew of legally recognized and nourished differences in social status, religious affiliation, nationality…The aforementioned Jacobin principle presented a break with conservative legal system and an innovation of modernity. Today, the situation is different. Most liberal-democracies, in one way or another, espouse basic tenants of multiculturalism, while France (and a couple of other states) still stubbornly resists. The situation today, seems exactly the opposite to that of the French Revolution, it is the principles of « La République, une et indivisible » and laïcité, that is considered retrograde, while multiculturalism (i.e. legal recognition of national minorities and their rights) seems to belong to the progressive current of contemporary political philosophy. This blog-entry will not try to resolve this normative dilemma for it believes that every country has a right to stick to its constitutional tradition to a certain extent (especially when such provisions do not seem bluntly contrary to the trends of modern liberalism-and the French system is not). The intention of this blog-entry, is rather to briefly examine the relationship between the aforementioned French Jacobin tradition and the TECE.
Is the TECE, if it comes into force, going to destroy the principle of « La République, une et indivisible » and make of France, a multicultural state like America, or even a “multinational federation” like Canada or Belgium?
According to some commentaries, the article II-70 of TECE, establishing Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, goes in the direction of multiculutralism (For an interesting debate on these issues see).
According to some interpretation of II-70, arguing that,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”
the French law on head-scarves, for example, could possibly be abolished for it is not in concordance with the EU Constitution.
Another, ‘suspiciously’ multiculturalist provision, is the following one,
“The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” (Article II-82)
Although ambiguous, this article could possibly be interpreted as to give it a multiculutralist meaning.
Could respecting religious diversity include promoting Corsican independence or autonomy? Probably not, main partisans of the national minority rights, secessionist claims, in the EU political arena, criticized the Constitution exactly for the opposite. These, so-called partisans of internal enlargement, as it was already argued in this blog, criticized the TECE for preventing the possibility of internal enlargement through several provisions. Most illustrative provision preventing any thought of territorial dismemberment of the EU Member States is the following,
“[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including those for ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, and for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security.” (Article I-5)
Finally, it seems that the TECE does not present a real threat to the French system. It is, however, certain that the Title II might be possibly regarded disgusting by a consistent Jacobin. Nevertheless, it would be exaggerated to claim that for this reason, Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, the chief of the founding fathers of TECE, deserves a guillotine and that France is bound to be forced to become a multicultural state.
Thursday, April 28, 2005
Lionel Jospin's come back for the European Constitution
A parallel can be drawn with the European Constitution. French voters, notably pro-european leftist, are inclined to vote No to the European Constitution. If this happens, they will end up in a non-position, sharing once again the same destiny as Le Pen. Hopefully, there'll be a second round. But the Constitution may look worse than it was in the first place.
Thursday, April 21, 2005
A Public Debate On the European Constitution
It is particularly difficult to do justice to this kind of debates without judging them through one's own prism of values. Few people, although very committed, were for the No. The remaining majority were for the Yes. Now, as it was rightly pointed out, there is a great variety of different Nos/Yes, that is, the reasons for voting in a certain direction in a referendum on a constitution are multiple. For example, supposing that France and the UK will say No, their Nos will have completely different, if not opposing, reasons.
Nevertheless, it is important to map, even if in a somewhat stylised way, the different Nos, and then rispond to them. To start with, I'll eliminate arguments coming from the extreme right, which claims itself as nationalist and anti-european. Its position is clear, and it is certainly not an European Constitution that would make them change their minds.
The positions I am concerned with span from moderate to extreme left wing, and they declare themselves as pro-european. They maintain, however, that the European Constitution is not a good step towards a better Europe. The first, less articulated, point of view comes from what I shall call the Vox Populi. People, it is argued with a purely rethorical device, are afraid of this "new liberal Europe". They cherish their "droits acquis"/ social standards, and they do not want to lose them. Nor do they want to share them: what if polish workers-- it has been argued--invaded France and, as a consequence, compete with local workers thereby depriving them of their high social protection?
Coming from what defines itself as a pro-european, leftist, standpoint the latter position has something deeply perverse. Not only it is incredibly nationalist, but it is also strikingly egoist, hence completely opposed to any idea of solidarity between individuals and between people. We want Europe provided that it means only more social protection!, would be the motto of this position. But the crucial question is, social protection for whom. Their answer would be: social protection for us.Where 'us', means French nationals. But not all of them, only the lucky one who have a social protection coming from their status as a worker (yet, I am sure that many French who do not benefit of a fully fledged social protection would happily trade-off less protection with more competition on the job market. Any sensible would in their position: I'd rather be employed and protect myself, than be unemployed and hope for an external protection!)
A second, more refined, standpoint can be defined as Euroimpatient. For them, the Constitution does not dare sufficiently. They want to see a brand new Europe, where tensions are sweeped away, social policies are carried out and enforced effectively, and where Europe can propose, and impose, its noble humanitarian concers to the rest of the world. Since the Constitution does not do all this ( Assuming that a Constitution can transform dreams into realities), they suggest a temporary arrangement whereby a group of virtuous pioneers (France and Germany and god knows who else) would go ahead establishing a reinforced cooperation on matters such as tax, defense, social justice etc. Of course, all this would be in the respect of all other countries: the coalition of the willing is not a closed family! Whoever wants to join the French TGV is very welcome to do so (even Turkey or Georgia). Isn't this beautiful and very innovative?, they wonder astonished.
Notwithstanding the ideal, which is surely noble from their own (individual) point of view, many doubts arise as to the desirability of such a view. This is best explicated in terms of the tension between the recent enlargement and the old federalist ambitions. Logically, it is not possible to be heartfelt defenders of the enlargement and proposers of rapid advanced integration amongst few, highly selected (only few member state can afford this luxury, provided that they want), members. Moreover, Euroimpatients fail to understand the tension, possibly even more problematic than the previous one, between economic growth and distribution of wealth. Even though ex-communist countries were champions of equal redistribution of wealth, they did not last very long because, after a while, there was nothing left to distribute. To be "good Robin Hoods" we still need something we can distribute. The only way to do so is by producing goods and services; the best way to produce goods is through a market where the competition is free and undistorted (I'd wish to know who wants a market where the competition is unfree and distorted). Thus, the problem with Europe cannot possibly be its stress on the common market. If anything the common market, when duly regulated, is a pre-condition of fair re-distribution.
Euroimpatients fail to acknowledge the sacrifices that newly enlarged countries went through in order to become part of the European Union. They haven't even started profiting of the advantages of the Union that they are told: Run faster lazy ones, we don't want to be burdened by your lack of willingness to cooperate, and accept our higher standards of integration! If this is solidarity, then freedom means slavery, as in the famous Orwellian line.
