New Blog on International Law

Have a look at this new blog on International law. It is called International Law Observer and covers a fairly broad ground!

New volume on international migration law

This volume, International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, edited by Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud and myself, has just been published by Asser Press, and was launched last Thursday at the Georgetown University Law Center.

The volume looks to provide a comprehensive overview of the "field" of international migration law, developing some key themes identified in a 2003 collection edited by Chetail and Aleinikoff, entitled Migration and International Legal Norms, and also indentifying some areas of emerging significance. It consists in six broad sections: state sovereignty and responsibility (including chapters on migration-related aspects of terrorism legislation, detention, and multiple nationality); trade and labour migration (with contributions on, amongst others, GATS Mode 4 and remittances); forced migration (looking at the law relating to refugees and internally displaced persons, and the compensation claims tribunals); human rights (with chapters on migrant workers, migrant women, trafficking and statelessness); regional free movement regimes (in Europe, Africa, South America and the Caribbean); and emerging issues (informal cooperation mechanisms, biometrics and the new EU Borders Code). It brings together works both by established academics, practitioners and younger scholars who have already made a contribution in their respective fields. It will, we hope, be both accessible to students and non-lawyers alike, whilst also being substantial enough to be of use to academics and practitioners already expert in their fields.

Available now in all good bookshops! Well, on Amazon, anyway...

Major blow to diplomatic assurances/torture memoranda

To return to an issue that I have blogged on previously, the controversial policy of the UK Government of signing "memoranda of understanding" with states suspected of carrying out or ignoring torture of detainees has been dealt a significant blow with the decision today by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission that two terror suspects that were scheduled for deportation to Libya must not be sent back there. The judgement in the case of DD and AS v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, available in full here, although not condemning outright such agreements in the abstract, held that the particular memorandum of understanding between the UK and Libya does not provide enough safeguards to allow the UK to fulfil its obligations under Art. 3 ECHR (the prohibition of torture). The crucial passage from the judgment reads as follows (para. 428):

Although we accept that the MOU and other assurances have been given in good faith by Libya, and that there is no probable risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR were the Appellants to be returned, there remains a real risk that that could happen. That is because there is too much scope for changes to happen, for things to go wrong, and too little scope for a breach of Article 3 to be deterred or for acts which might lead to a breach of Article 3 to be remedied in time, essentially through effective monitoring. There is also a real risk that the trial of the Appellants would amount to a complete denial of a fair trial. We do not exclude the possibility that the SSHD’s case for their deportation could be strengthened over time.

A number of important points can be gleaned from that paragraph alone. Firstly, there need not be any mala fides on the part of the potential receiving state for a memorandum of understanding to be found insufficient to avoid responsibility under Art. 3 ECHR. Secondly, the level of risk necessary that such assurances would be violated is set commendably low: improbable, but genuine. Thirdly, factors such as political volatility, the likelihood of change, and the possibilities for effective monitoring can be essential in determining whether a risk is genuine or not, however improbable. Lastly, the SIAC makes it clear that this is a contextual, and not a general or abstract, judgment, and that changing conditions in Libya over time may mean that diplomatic assurances can be effective in allowing the UK to deport terror suspects there without violating Art. 3 ECHR.

These points, along with a number of others, are dealt with in the judgment in more detail. There is, for example, a lengthy discussion both of Qadhafi's character, and the manner in which his new rapprochement with the West has been driven by an instrumental pragmatism which could, if the situation so demanded, see it reversed, particularly in isolated cases involving the interrogation of islamist extremists (see e.g. paras. 333-372 of the judgment). The Commission concluded that "[t]here is not yet the range of contacts or years of experience of dealing with each other at many different and friendly levels, or the depth of other links between Libya and the UK which would make the diplomatic path predictable" enough for a diplomatic assurance as to the non-resort to torture to be viewed as absolutely watertight (para. 370), even if Libya's recent and continuing rapprochement with the West is a factor of genuine - and increasing - importance in this regard. The necessary chance of such a risk materialising is set out clearly in the following passage (para. 371):

We have accordingly come to the conclusion that although it is probable that [witness for the Home Department] Mr Layden’s judgment as to how the Libyans would observe the MOU in relation to the physical treatment of the Appellants is sound, and that they would not be ill-treated in a way which breached Article 3, we cannot adopt his conclusion that that would be well-nigh unthinkable. Instead we think that there is a real risk that that would happen... We do not therefore have the confidence which we need to have, for the return of the Appellants not to breach the UK’s international obligations. In short there is too much scope for something to go wrong, and too little in place to deter ill-treatment or to bring breaches of the MOU to the UK’s attention.

There is thus also significant consideration given to the matter of monitoring: where the guarantee of adherence to diplomatic assurances rests on a pragmatic ascertation of self-interest (and not, for example, on a growing commitment to human rights, or a culture of honouring one's given word), the first calculation of a regime that thought that it may stand to gain from torturing detainees would not be the threat of sanctions from, or the deteroration in relationship with, the returning state, but whether it could prevent any breach coming to light. The ability of an MOU to work where a regime could use well known ploys to prevent access to a prisoner does depend on the monitoring body having access or the willingness to report obstructions to the sending country. The very real prospect here that a breach could go undetected, or undetected for a long time, means that the potential adverse reaction from the UK would also be delayed or prevented. The downside of any breach could be markedly diminished" (para. 365).

The issue of monitoring, then, becomes vital. The Commission notes, for example, that strong civil society monitoring bodies, such as a free press or genuinely independent NGOs, or even a strong public constituency of popular support for Islamic militancy, are not present. The Commission goes on to note that the body envisaged as implementation monitor, the Qadhafi Development Foundation, although by far the best-placed "NGO" for the job, enjoying a degree of independence unique among Libyan NGOs, is not sufficient for the task. Although it does have an important track record of human rights protection and humanitarian advocacy, it's President is Saif al Islam al Qadhafi, Colonel Qadhafi's second son, who, despite his reformist opinions, is nonetheless still deeply limited in the criticisms he can level at the regime. The QDF, then, would be useful in monitoring the Memorandum in cases in which a rogue guard tortured detainees against the will of the regime; this is not, however, viewed as particularly likely. In the more probable scenario, of torture sanctioned at the highest level, it would be effectively voiceless. The Commission concludes that "[i]t [the QDF] is no more independent of the regime than is Saif himself, and he is not independent" (para. 330).

Other issues include the possibility that the length of time spent in detention either pre-trial (paras. 375-376) and on death row (paras. 377-378) could lead, indirectly, to a breach of Art. 3 ECHR, although, in terms of the latter, execution was not viewed as a real risk - even if a death sentence was a real possibility, it was unlikely to be carried out; and the possibility, gleaned from tentative ECtHR dicta, that the probable lack of a fair trial in the receiving state might act as a barrier to deportation ("[t]he ECtHR has not enunciated any general principle that a state bears an indirect responsibility for breaches of the ECHR by states which are not parties but to whose territories someone is deported", para. 397), holding that a "balancing" (at least in terms of derogable rights) between the rights of the deportee and those of individuals he put at risk, or threat to the host state, could be carried out (para. 400). The Commission even dealt with the significance of Qadhafi's strong personal relationship with the outgoing Tony Blair (para. 380). Lastly, the one of the appellants had raised the possibility that, given his family situation in the UK, deportation would amount to a violation of the right to family life contained in Art. 8 ECHR; an idea dismissed by the Commission in this case (paras. 405-414).

The other area of real interest concerns the Commission's judgment with respect to the 1951 Refugee Convention (it does not consider the Convention Against Torture at all, but we may assume that its holdings in terms of Art. 3 ECHR would also be applicable to the UK's obligations inder the CAT, and in particular its own Art. 3 provision on non-refoulement). In short, it seems unlikely that the Refugee Convention will be of particular importance in cases involving suspected terrorists within the UK in the future: one of the appellants, DD, had already been successfully through a refugee status determination in the UK; however, the Commission ruled that the Secretary of State was correct in his assertion that DD's terrorist activities meant that he was excluded from the provisions and protections of the Convention. The relvent provisions of the Convention read as follows:

1. F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that.
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

33. 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

The Commission considered the claim that, as the acts upon which the UK was relying in excluding DD from protection under the Convention had occurred after the positive refugee status determination, they could not be used to divest him of that status (paras. 110-112). This position seemed to be supported by a Canadian Supreme Court case, Pushpanathan v. Canada (MC1) [1999] INLR 36, in which the Court held that "the general purpose of Article 1F is not the protection of the society of refuge from dangerous refugees, whether because of acts committed before or after the presentation of a refugee claim; that purpose is served by Article 33 of the Convention. Rather, it is to exclude ab initio those who are not bona fide refugees at the time of their claim for refugee status" (para 58 of that judgment). This, however, was not accepted by the SIAC, who, following a judgment of the UK Immigration Appeals Tribunal (in KK v. SSHD [2004] UKIAT 00101) noted that, given the words "prior to his admission to that country as a refugee" were inserted into Art. 1F(b) alone, meant that they could not be read into Art. 1F(a) or (c); thus DD could be stripped of refugee status if he engaged subsequently in "acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations" - of which terrorism is a generally accepted example (para. 121).

Lastly, the Commission held that, even if DD were not excluded from protection under Art. 1F, then the non-refoulement provision would not apply as a result of Art. 33(2): "It is obvious from our conclusions about national security that it is our view that there are “reasonable grounds” for regarding him as a danger to the security of the UK", and concluding moreover that neither here nor in Art. 1F was the deporting state required to balance the potential for individual rights violation against the suspects if deported against the risk to itself and its citizens. As soon as the criteria of Arts. 1F or 33(2) were fulfilled, there is no bar under the Refugee Convention to deporting the individual in question (although of course other obligations, such as the ECHR or the CAT may well still apply) (paras. 125-126).


One of the most striking things about this judgment in general is the level of acceptance that the appellants are dangerous men, deeply involved in Islamic militancy and posing genuine threats to the UK's national security. The Commission conducts a detailed review of the appellants' activites, and concludes, for example, that "We are entirely satisfied that DD is a real and direct threat to the national security of the UK... [who] is a global jihadist with links to the Taleban and Al Qa’eda" (paras. 71-72), and that "on the open evidence alone AS is a clear danger to national security. He is an Islamist extremist who has engaged actively and as a senior member with a terrorist group clearly engaged in support work for jihadist activities" (para. 104). The Commission makes, to my mind, a commendable summary of the choice facing it, which has led it to its equally commendable decision (para. 430):

We have given this decision anxious consideration in view of the risks which the Appellants could face were they returned, and those which the UK, and individuals who can legitimately look to it for the protection of their human rights, would face if they were not. We must judge that matter, at least in relation to Article 3 ECHR, by considering only the risks which the Appellants could face on return, no matter how grave and violent the risks which, having chosen to come here, they pose to the UK, its interests abroad, and its wider interests. Those interests at risk include fundamental human rights.

The effect of this passage, which to me nicely encapsulates the tragic dilemma posed by this extremely hard ethical question, is, sadly, somewhat diminished by the almost petulant tone adopted by the Commission in the very next paragraph:

The decision of the ECtHR in Chahal in 1996 provides the framework for that decision. It clearly requires us to consider matters in that way, however slight its reasoning or negligible its response to the substantial minority dissent on the problems posed by a direct threat comparable to that arising here to the interests of the country seeking removal, and on the protection to the human rights of others which the deportation of the Appellants would afford. That decision is part of its established jurisprudence, and in reality we are bound by it.

With these last words, the Commission seeks to challenge the absolute legal prohibition laid down by the ECtHR in terms of refoulement in torture cases, implicitly suggesting instead that this should be subject to the kind of legal balancing act common to many other rights dilemmas. There is no space to go into this in detail here, but many, myself included, although believing that, ethically speaking and at an abstract level, torture can and must be balanced against other possible ethical risks (that there can, philosophically, be no absolutes), it is a different matter entirely to attempt to write that necessary relativism into positive law. It is a subject on which I may blog more soon; for the moment, however, it is enough to refer any reader who have made it this far to Jeremy Waldron's excellent article on the subject, "Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the Whitehouse", 105 Columbia Law Review (2005) 1681-1750.

GAL at NYU

A quick post to flag a project that I have recently become involved with: the emerging field of Global Administrative Law, a research project involving a wide network of scholars, based at New York University. The project is driven by two basic insights: firstly, that much of the global or transnational regulation currently viewed under the rubric of "governance" can be properly seen as regulatory administration; and secondly that a body of administrative law is emerging that seeks to regulate that regulation. There is, however, both a descriptive and a prescriptive element to the research agenda: not merely what are the principles of an administrative law character that are shaping global governance, but also what should they be. The website provides the following working definition of the project (which is fleshed out in much more detail in a couple of conceptual papers on the issue):

Much of global governance can be understood as regulatory administration. Such regulatory administration is often organized and shaped by principles of an administrative law character. Building on these twin ideas, we argue that a body of global administrative law is emerging. This is the law of transparency, participation, review, and above all accountability in global governance. We posit an increasingly discernible “global administrative space”, in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has broken down, administrative functions are performed in complex relations between officials and institutions not organized in a single hierarchy, and regulation using non-binding forms often proves highly effective in practice. Exercises of public power in the global administrative space are increasingly channeled, and controlled, by mechanisms of an administrative law type. These include rules requiring greater transparency, adoption of notice-and-comment procedures in rule-making, and the opening of new or strengthened avenues of judicial and administrative review. We thus regard global administrative law as encompassing the legal mechanisms, principles, and practices, along with supporting social understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make. We describe this field of law as “global” rather than “international” to encompass the enmeshment of national and intergovernmental regulation, the increasing roles of private regulators and public-private hybrid bodies, the wide array of informal institutional arrangements that now operate alongside formal institutions, and the foundations of the field in normative practices, and normative sources, that extend beyond international law sources.

The Project distinguished among, but seeks to encompass each of, five main types of globalized administrative regulation. These are: (1) International Administration, by formal international organizations (such as United Nations Security Council individual sanctions programs, or UN administration of territory); (2) Network Administration, based on collective action by transnational networks of cooperative arrangements between national regulatory officials (such as the Basel Committee of national bank regulators); (3) Distributed Administration conducted by national regulators under treaty, network, or other cooperative regimes (such as the Basel Convention on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes); (4) Hybrid Administration, by hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements (such as ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers); and (5) Private Administration, by private institutions with regulatory functions (such as the ISO, the International Organization for Standardization).

New systems of administrative procedures, review mechanisms, and decisional principles have arisen to promote greater accountability in decision-making by this rapidly proliferating variety of global regulatory administrative bodies. The subjects of such global regulatory systems include individuals, firms and other economic actors, states, and non-governmental organizations. Global Administrative Law is an emerging field of law and practice addressing both the new structures of administrative law and international law that have arisen in these different institutional contexts, and their normative dimensions, including regime integrity, protection of subjects' rights and promotion of democratic values.

It seems to me that, from this useful and provocative working definition, a number of interesting questions immediately arise at an abstract, general level: in what sense can these administrative law principles be justifiably characterised as "global" (in that the negative justification offered, in contradistinction to the "international", may be necessary but insufficient to justify this rhetoric)? Does it really make sense to talk of one unified global administrative space, rather than a plurality of spaces? What is the relationship of global administrative law to the emerging, if at least equally vague, sphere of "global/international constitutionalism"? And how do the administrative law ends of transparency, participation, review and accountability relate, if at all, to notions of democratic governance?

Such issues are only a small, if important, part of the research agenda. Much focus otherwise is on empirical studies of actual administrative regimes, in order to discern what the principles and norms guiding there function are, and what elements, if any, seem to be common among them. The website provides access to a large number of articles and working papers on the issue. As I mentioned, it is a project that I have recently become (heavily) involved with, so any and all comments on it are welcome!

Europe at 50: Another Perspective

Timothy Garton Ash provides an interesting discussion in Prospect.

Here's an excerpt:

Europe has lost the plot. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the treaty of Rome on 25th March 2007—the 50th birthday of the European economic community that became the European Union—Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A shared political narrative sustained the postwar project of (west) European integration for three generations, but it has fallen apart since the end of the cold war. Most Europeans now have little idea where we're coming from; far less do we share a vision of where we want to go to. We don't know why we have an EU or what it's good for. So we urgently need a new narrative.

Attempts of Dialogue on Afghanistan between America and Italy

Italy proposes an international conference for peace and stability.
And America listens interested... Is this a sign of Bush's new multilateral approach?
too soon to say, or perhaps too late!

For a report have a look here: http://www.corriere.it/english/articoli/2007/03_Marzo/21/Alema.shtml

Here's an excerpt:

Unexpectedly, the United States yesterday did not rule out an “international conference for peace and stability in Afghanistan”, the carefully crafted diplomatic formula adopted by [Italy’s foreign minister, Massimo – Trans.] D’Alema for a political solution to the Afghan crisis.The State Department’s spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that “it could be a constructive suggestion”. “We want to understand some of the details”, he continued. “Fundamentally, you want to get the opinion of the Afghan Government and President Karzai about this. So I think it’s really an idea that merits some discussion”. “And to see”, concluded Mr McCormack, “whether or not, on the basis of that discussion, you move forward or not”.

Europe and North Korea

Another interesting area in which the European Presidency is actively engaged (statement released by the Presidency):

Today (Tuesday, 6 March), a delegation of the European Union, led by Germany´s EU presidency, will travel to Pyongyang in North Korea for two days of high-level political talks (6 8 March).

The aim of this trip by the EU Troika is to promote the rapid implementation of an agreement reached on 13 February in Beijing during the Six-Party Talks on North Korea´s nuclear programme. The European Union expressly welcomed this agreement. Furthermore, the delegation will emphasize that the EU expects the Six-Party Talks to continue with a view to implementing all the agreements included in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.

The European Union is committed to security and stability in the region and to the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. For that reason, both Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as representative of the German presidency of the EU Council, and Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Javier Solana, have welcomed the efforts made by the Six Parties and the understandings they have reached.

For the EU, the trip also is of an exploratory nature since the outcome of the visit will provide important guidelines for discussions within the EU as to its future relations with North Korea.The Troika delegation comprises Germany´s current EU presidency as well as representatives of the European Commission and the Secretariat General of the European Union. Portugal, which will take over the EU presidency after Germany, will also participate.

Europe and the Future of Georgia

The Presidency of the EU has issued the following statement:

The European Union reiterates its full support for the territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and emphasises that it does not recognise the legitimacy of the so-called "Parliamentary elections" held in Abkhazia, Georgia, on 4 March 2007 and of the local elections held on 11 February 2007.

The European Union holds the view that elections in this region of Georgia can only be valid after all refugees and internally-displaced persons are given the right to a safe, secure and dignified return to their homes.

The European Union urges the parties concerned to immediately resume negotiations in order to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Play it Again, Romano

This Wednesday, Prodi is going to go back to Parliament to have his government (the same) re-approved.

He will obviously start with the Senate, as it is in the Senate that he lost the majority. It seems that some of the right wing senators are willing to support Prodi this time round, so his majority will increase, but it is unclear whether this move will make the government more stable.

Italian Government falls on American military base in Vicenza

The Italian government went down in Parliament. The issue was an American military base in Vicenza and the parliament had to decide whether to give a green light.

Most of the extreme left wing was opposed to it, and d'Alema, the foreign affair minister, did not manage to convince them to vote in favour of the military base.

As a result, d'Alema has resigned and the government will have to be reshuffled. It is likely that Prodi will form a second government, but d'Alema will not be in it anymore.

Hard times ahead for Prodi who will certainly not be strengthened by this accident.

North Korea: Past and Future

North Korea is still a ticking bomb. An interesting article on the NYRB examines recent developments and future scenarios.

Here's the interesting conclusion:

Oddly though, what Kim Jong Il would decide if asked to choose between the bomb and a full, normal, nonbelligerent relationship with Washington has never been tested. Very likely, a working relationship with the United States would prove more subversive of the North Korean dictatorship than the efforts to isolate it and punish it have been. It is something that a new administration might try, assuming it is not already too late.

CIA's kidnappings in Italy

Some further judicial frictions between Italy and the US. After the accidents involved in the killing of an italian secret agent (Calipari) in Iraq, Italy is trying again to bring some US CIA agents before the courts. Here's a report

Berlusconi's government is very likely to have turned a blind eye on the practice of rendition. Prodi will not be as lineant.

Kofi Annan's Last words

Here, you can find Kofi Annan's last speech on the Middle East to the UN.

Independence of Kosovo vs. Humanitarian Interventions

In the current issue of the German Law Journal, entirely dedicated to the legal dimension of the future status of the Serbian Province of Kosovo I published an article: Srdjan Cvijic, “Self-determination as a challenge to the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions: The Case of Kosovo”, German Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2007

This article questions the legality of imposing independence for Kosovo without the consent of Serbia. It does so by firmly linking this question to the debate on the nature and legality of NATO’s 1999 humanitarian intervention in the FRY / Serbia. The UN-mediated process for negotiating the future status of this southern Serbian province, as well as the legal origin of the UN-mandated administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), represent a continuation of the original military and political involvement of NATO and the entire international community initiated six years ago. It is for this reason that no decision on the future status of Kosovo can be reached without bearing in mind the original basis of international involvement in FRY / Serbia. This article will analyse authoritative international jurisprudence that demonstrates how only “a thin red line” divides humanitarian interventions from being legal under international law. It further argues that instances of humanitarian intervention can, over time, acquire legality provided that stringent conditions are respected, the most important of which being that they serve no purpose other than the prevention of grave and immediate threats to human life. Consequently, humanitarian intervention should not serve as a tool for achieving political goals such as greater political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within any given country. Infringement of this condition would amount to a revolutionary challenge to international law and threaten the return of the predominance of spheres of influence in international relations and law, taking us back to a past where war was considered the legitimate “continuation of politics by other means”. The imposition of an independence status for Kosovo on Serbia would not only amount to a revolutionary challenge to the established norms of international law, but would also jeopardize the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

GLJ Koskenniemi Symposium

The excellent German Law Journal, a free online journal focusing, in part, on issues of public international law, has a fascinating collection of articles on From Apology to Utopia, written to mark the republication (with a new, extensive epilogue) of the already-classic volume. Countributors are a mix of established academics (such as David Kennedy) and up-and-coming scholars, and include a response from Koskenniemi himself. Well worth a read.

Blair's Battle for Global Values

Tony Blair has decided what to do when he quits his post as Prime Minister:
He will be Philosopher! Here's a lengthy analysis of his political thought on global war and Justice.

This is the abstract: The war on terrorism is not just about security or military tactics. It is a battle of values, and one that can only be won by the triumph of tolerance and liberty. Afghanistan and Iraq have been the necessary starting points of this battle. Success there, however, must be coupled with a bolder, more consistent, and more thorough application of global values, with Washington leading the way.

Feel free to assess Blair's consistency. Words and Deeds do not always match...

The Only Possible Thing to say: No to Death Penalty

I hope that Europe will stick to its position at least on this one. No to the Death Penalty, not even for Saddam Hussein, Mussolini or Hitler.

We have abolished the death penalty all over Europe. It is a matter of our principles, and it clearly distinguished us from the US, even if we agree with them on many other things.

But Europe must speak up, and must do so on issues of principle such as this one. It would be absolutely incoherent to be absolutely against death penalty at home (Europe) and to accept it abroad, wherever this happens.

At least on this one, we can speak of our objective stance on an important issue.

The mythology of international judicial fragmentation

An entertaining post, well worth a read, over at Opinion Juris, where Cesare Romano sketches the parallels between the rise and fall of the International Court of Justice and the theme of usurping the father-figure in ancient Greek mythology. The plethora of fragmented judicial bodies, from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism through international criminal tribunals to regional entities such as the ECJ and ECtHR have rebelled against the ICJ's attempt to subordinate them and retain its own dominant position in the international judicial heirarchy, eventually "emasculating" the body that begat them.

One thing is missing from his analogy, however; in the Greek mythology he refers to, the sucessful usurper proceeded to construct a new heirarchy, with himself installed at its summit. Some such structure seems inherent in the notion of order, and legal order in particular; we must ask, then, if we are to condemn the ICJ as "already passé", who is to become the new dominant actor on the global level? The obvious answer is not, for many, a particularly palatable one, and yet there is only one institution of global reach with a strong (indeed, compulsory) judicial mechanism: the WTO.

With this in mind, perhaps we can retain the hope that reports of the ICJ's demise have been greatly exaggerated. Undoubtedly, it is an institution in dire need of serious reform, but the all-too-ready willingness to confine it to the textbooks of international legal history itself creates the risk, which Romano himself fears, that the dominant role of general interpreter of international law, the apex of the fragmented international judicial system, will be assumed not by the best suited, but simply by the best placed. In the current global climate, and for the foreseeable future, it is only the perceived necessities of economic logic that have the strength to get states to commit to compulsory dispute settlement measures.

The fear, of course - and one that Romano shares - is that in getting rid of a tribunal with general responsibility for, and competence in, all aspects of international law, we will allow a single conceptual framework to dominate and interpret all others. The ecomomic mindset is already extremely influential in global affairs; to allow it to come to dominate in law itself would be potentially disastrous for the diversity of viewpoint and in-depth specialisation that has driven the fragmentation process that we have witnessed over the past few decades. This specialisation has brought a new level of maturity and richness to the international legal scene; it is something that we should be looking to preserve to the greatest degree possible whilst retaining a sense of order.

There are certainly no shortage of examples, from ancient or far more recent history, of cases in which people have been too quick to welcome the demise of an old ruler without full awareness of who will rise to take his place, and of the new heirarchical structure that will be initiated, and have come to regret the speed with which the old was jettisoned to make way for the new. It may be, of course, that the ICJ is simply too far gone to rescue; if that is the case, however, this is a time for the utmost vigilance as to its successor, not for either the triumphalism or complacency with which news of its demise is often greeted.

Romano's short piece, however, is neither complacent nor triumphant, and provides us with a vivid new way of imagining both the history and the future or the international judicial system. Like I said, well worth a read.

Serbia v. the International Community

To return to a topic that we have discussed on this blog on numerous occasions (see, for example, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here, amongst others), Serbia has sent a fairly clear signal to the international community that it is not prepared to contemplate what many are simply assuming will be the final outcome of the Kosovo status negotiations, an independent Kosovar state, by endorsing nothing less than a new Constitution which declares Kosovo to be part of Serbian territory for eternity; and this only a few short weeks before the Security Council is expected to rule on the issue.

The EU and the US have dismissed the move as "irrelevant" - an incredible suggestion when one considers that it is the territorial integrity, involving long-recognised borders, of an independent state that is concerned. Whatever the outcome, it seems clear that any enforced separation of Kosovo from Serbia will be vigorously (we can only hope peacefully) by the latter; and this turns it into a significant problem for international law, as there seems to be no chance of Serbia simply acquiescing to the Security Council's expected attempt to force the independence option. We will thus, it seems, have a precedent ("exceptional" or otherwise) where the international community will act to divide up an existing (and democratic) state, where no current threat to international peace and security currently exists. A bold move, indeed; but one that could, if handled without huge sensitivity, backfire spectacularly in this historically most volatile region of Europe.

Nationalists call for sweeping Iraq inquiry

A little interest today, perhaps, from the House of Commons, where there will be a vote on a proposal by the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties (the SNP and Plaid Cymru) which calls for a review panel of seven senior MPs to conduct an inquiry into "the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in relation to Iraq and all matters relevant thereto, in the period leading up to military action in that country in March 2003 and in its aftermath". What makes this minority party action particularly interesting today, however, is that not only do they have the Liberal Democrats on side, but the Tories have just announced that, if the Government will not provide guarantees that such an inquiry will be held upon withdrawal from Iraq, they will support the motion for one to begin immediately.

Blair, of course, is resisting the call, basically on the grounds that it would be "unpatriotic", and would undermine the position of the troops on the ground; basically, the normal rhetorical ploys to supress the legitimate (indeed, necessary) debates on what he must now fear will be the defining issue of his ten years in office, now formulated in terms strikingly similar to those of his US counterpart: "We have troops who are operating in the field of combat. We have an enemy who is looking for any sign of weakness at all, any sign of a loss of resolution or determination. The important thing is that we do not give any signal that we are anything less than fully determined to see the job through". It is possible that this line of argument will also find some favour among some Conservatives, whatever the party leadership decides, and Labour does have a significant overall majority in any event; however, with a significant number of Labour backbenchers still extremely angry about Blair's actions in terms of the war in general, it is just possible, if unlikely, that there will be an upset here. To give you an idea, Blair's working majority is 67, and the Nationalists claim the support of at least 30 Labour rebels. It might be close...

The debate is due to start at around 16.00 GMT, and is scheduled to continue for 3 hours, after which will come the vote. Watch this space...