The ICRC has published a report on customary international law in the realm of international humanitarian law. I will resist the nearly irresistible urge to opine on both my thoughts on the ICRC (positive and negative) and the some very objectionable points in its report. I do promise everyone that much ink will be spilt parsing the language of this report in the endless (and fruitless?) search for viable CIL.
Tip to Opinio Juris for the heads up.
Wednesday, April 13, 2005
EU: an unsufficiently democratic neo-liberal project
In 2001, Pierre Bourdieu was saying : It isn’t easy, when talking about the European Union, to be even heard. The journalistic field, which filters, intercepts and interprets all the public discourses according to its most typical logic – that of the all or noting – tries to impose its alternative on every one: to be in favour of Europe, that is progressivist, open, modern, liberal, or to be against it, and be condemned to archaism, to racism and to be old fashioned…(1). There is a little bit of that in Srdjan Cvijic’s post where he offers some of his criticism on the call to vote No at the referendum on the European Constitution.
If I understand him well, we, left wing promoters of the No, follow this logic: we want to live in a State capable of adopting welfare policies; we believe that the more democratic a State is, the more likely it will adopt such policies; we believe that the traditional nation state is more liberal than the European Union; therefore we want to preserve it and are led to refuse the Constitution.
I am sure that he is right in the sense that some people that define themselves as being from the left wing adopt that logic. However, all do not. Right now, in France, there are 3 types of justifications proposed for voting against the Constitution: 1/ a racist justification according to which we should stay among ourselves, that we are different and should not mix (the same justification which is used against the entrance of Turkey by people not generally classified as racists); 2/ a conservative justification according to which the present national institutions have enabled us to reach levels – in terms of democracy, economical performance and social harmony – that the European institutions do not guaranty (this argument is defended by people from the right as well as from the left wing); 3/ a progressist argument, very critical towards current national institutions, according to which the progress obtained through the European Constitution is not good enough.
Respecting Lorenzo’s distinction, the arguments of the third type of justification addresses subsequently, the institutional and the economical aspects of the constitution (for an example). In Part I, the institutional arrangements are improved compared to previous treaties; notably the new powers of the Parliament in the procedure for the adoption of the budget. However this constitution was a golden chance to do much better; why not be more ambitious, why be satisfied with this result? Many proponents of the No in France welcome the type of renewal of the democratic theory that Srdjan is talking about. National institutions are old and boring and change is exciting; participation at national elections drop constantly, the far-right party obtains regularly 15 % of the votes so we would have to be crazy to hold on to this Republic of the past. But it’s not because we welcome, and don’t fear change, that we should accept any type of change. It is sufficient to believe that in voting No, change will come about in a more radical way. As for the economical aspects, Srdjan agrees that the European Union is neo-liberal as it is. How is it possible to say more clearly that it doesn’t fit with a radical leftist position? (2) If the law of the European Union is largely neo-liberal, that is a very good reason to reject the Constitution that confirms that ideology and gives it a symbolic constitutional nature. What we refuse here is the statu quo, what we condemn is that the chance to change that orientation was not taken. I really don’t understand why Lorenzo doesn’t see that as any kind of valuable argument.
I have no certainty about the referendum (3) . Sometimes I wake up at night because of it, not knowing how I should vote. Whether the progressivist No to the referendum is right or not, it is important not to describe it as a caricature of a snobbish-dirigist French position. First of all, it isn’t only French and there is no reason why it should be. For example, Attac in Germany has just declared itself supportive of our position. I suppose that if a referendum had been organized in Italy for example, the same phenomenon would have happened. It is taking place in France because we are lucky enough to have a referendum. The debate came about as the result of a very specific process for which I don’t know of any precedents in this country. The specificities of that phenomenon can be resumed in the following points: 1/ the campaign for the No is not led by political parties (aside from the communist party, the major left wing parties are in favour of the Constitution), many of the opponents of the Constitution that are heard in the media are not professional politicians; 2/ the opposition is composed in a large part by people active in the European forums organised in “think tanks” of the social society (for example La foundation Copernic, l’Appel des 200), that have unprecedented regional and international extensions; 3/ the European Union (its nature, history, future, the way it works etc.) have become the main political object of discussion ; 4/ as a consequence of the conjunction of points 1 to 3, the European Union has become an object of interest in a revitalised democratic debate that occupies parts of the public sphere that it had abandoned (the work place, school, the streets, bars etc.).
You see, opponents of the Constitution are still European citizens and they are proving it by exercising their right to participate in a public debate about Europe. Even a victory of the No at the French referendum would be the highest degree of a European democratic integration to date, not only in France, but probably in any European country. Certainly more so than in countries where the constitution’s acceptance by Parliament was ignored by the public opinion. Not only is it the case because Europe is the subject of the public debate but also because, in the way this debate is conducted, a rejection of what democracy has become (or always was) inside the nation State is formulated very clearly.
What I see happening is the reconstruction of a radical, European, left wing movement. Pierre Bourdieu and many others in all countries of the world had been calling for it for years; well, this referendum, this constitution, have given it the possibility, the motivation, the public space and the audience to take a step forward. The worst thing that could happen to that movement would be to portrayed, by other leftists in Europe, as a mere conservatism (in Srdjan’s point of view) or as French-rigidity (in Lorenzo’s).
(1) P. Bourdieu, Contre-feux 2, Paris, Raison d’agir, 2001.
(2) If Lorenzo wants to define the left as an ideology that believes in economical liberalism, that agrees with neo-liberalism, than the adjective radical becomes very important. I realise however that it is not enough to constantly talk about neo-liberalism without being more precise. I will try to be more convincing when I will answer Lorenzo’s challenge to explain why the Bolkestein directive was, and still is, bad. However I wont answer it as a Frenchmen (the challenge is issued to every French people as if only them had good reasons to fight this directive) but as a proponent of a radical leftist No to the constitution.
(3) The only certainty I have, is that anyone that is completely sure and too affirmative is, or a liar (most often for the needs of public or political argumentation), or hasn’t thought about it seriously. No one can be affirmative if it is at the same time a question of principle and a pragmatic question. A question of principle because, in the last analysis we decide ourselves according to our beliefs, our feelings that we formalises and rationalise as political and moral principles (see for a telling example Lorenzo’s justification of his preference for what he calls the UK-liberal model). A pragmatic question because we apply those principles to conjectures we make about what this constitution’s effects will be. I can see how some people can have certainties about the rightness of their principles but it would be simply foolish to pretend to know what will happen in the future. Of course it’s not a good enough reason not to take a position but the position we take should remain aware of this.
If I understand him well, we, left wing promoters of the No, follow this logic: we want to live in a State capable of adopting welfare policies; we believe that the more democratic a State is, the more likely it will adopt such policies; we believe that the traditional nation state is more liberal than the European Union; therefore we want to preserve it and are led to refuse the Constitution.
I am sure that he is right in the sense that some people that define themselves as being from the left wing adopt that logic. However, all do not. Right now, in France, there are 3 types of justifications proposed for voting against the Constitution: 1/ a racist justification according to which we should stay among ourselves, that we are different and should not mix (the same justification which is used against the entrance of Turkey by people not generally classified as racists); 2/ a conservative justification according to which the present national institutions have enabled us to reach levels – in terms of democracy, economical performance and social harmony – that the European institutions do not guaranty (this argument is defended by people from the right as well as from the left wing); 3/ a progressist argument, very critical towards current national institutions, according to which the progress obtained through the European Constitution is not good enough.
Respecting Lorenzo’s distinction, the arguments of the third type of justification addresses subsequently, the institutional and the economical aspects of the constitution (for an example). In Part I, the institutional arrangements are improved compared to previous treaties; notably the new powers of the Parliament in the procedure for the adoption of the budget. However this constitution was a golden chance to do much better; why not be more ambitious, why be satisfied with this result? Many proponents of the No in France welcome the type of renewal of the democratic theory that Srdjan is talking about. National institutions are old and boring and change is exciting; participation at national elections drop constantly, the far-right party obtains regularly 15 % of the votes so we would have to be crazy to hold on to this Republic of the past. But it’s not because we welcome, and don’t fear change, that we should accept any type of change. It is sufficient to believe that in voting No, change will come about in a more radical way. As for the economical aspects, Srdjan agrees that the European Union is neo-liberal as it is. How is it possible to say more clearly that it doesn’t fit with a radical leftist position? (2) If the law of the European Union is largely neo-liberal, that is a very good reason to reject the Constitution that confirms that ideology and gives it a symbolic constitutional nature. What we refuse here is the statu quo, what we condemn is that the chance to change that orientation was not taken. I really don’t understand why Lorenzo doesn’t see that as any kind of valuable argument.
I have no certainty about the referendum (3) . Sometimes I wake up at night because of it, not knowing how I should vote. Whether the progressivist No to the referendum is right or not, it is important not to describe it as a caricature of a snobbish-dirigist French position. First of all, it isn’t only French and there is no reason why it should be. For example, Attac in Germany has just declared itself supportive of our position. I suppose that if a referendum had been organized in Italy for example, the same phenomenon would have happened. It is taking place in France because we are lucky enough to have a referendum. The debate came about as the result of a very specific process for which I don’t know of any precedents in this country. The specificities of that phenomenon can be resumed in the following points: 1/ the campaign for the No is not led by political parties (aside from the communist party, the major left wing parties are in favour of the Constitution), many of the opponents of the Constitution that are heard in the media are not professional politicians; 2/ the opposition is composed in a large part by people active in the European forums organised in “think tanks” of the social society (for example La foundation Copernic, l’Appel des 200), that have unprecedented regional and international extensions; 3/ the European Union (its nature, history, future, the way it works etc.) have become the main political object of discussion ; 4/ as a consequence of the conjunction of points 1 to 3, the European Union has become an object of interest in a revitalised democratic debate that occupies parts of the public sphere that it had abandoned (the work place, school, the streets, bars etc.).
You see, opponents of the Constitution are still European citizens and they are proving it by exercising their right to participate in a public debate about Europe. Even a victory of the No at the French referendum would be the highest degree of a European democratic integration to date, not only in France, but probably in any European country. Certainly more so than in countries where the constitution’s acceptance by Parliament was ignored by the public opinion. Not only is it the case because Europe is the subject of the public debate but also because, in the way this debate is conducted, a rejection of what democracy has become (or always was) inside the nation State is formulated very clearly.
What I see happening is the reconstruction of a radical, European, left wing movement. Pierre Bourdieu and many others in all countries of the world had been calling for it for years; well, this referendum, this constitution, have given it the possibility, the motivation, the public space and the audience to take a step forward. The worst thing that could happen to that movement would be to portrayed, by other leftists in Europe, as a mere conservatism (in Srdjan’s point of view) or as French-rigidity (in Lorenzo’s).
(1) P. Bourdieu, Contre-feux 2, Paris, Raison d’agir, 2001.
(2) If Lorenzo wants to define the left as an ideology that believes in economical liberalism, that agrees with neo-liberalism, than the adjective radical becomes very important. I realise however that it is not enough to constantly talk about neo-liberalism without being more precise. I will try to be more convincing when I will answer Lorenzo’s challenge to explain why the Bolkestein directive was, and still is, bad. However I wont answer it as a Frenchmen (the challenge is issued to every French people as if only them had good reasons to fight this directive) but as a proponent of a radical leftist No to the constitution.
(3) The only certainty I have, is that anyone that is completely sure and too affirmative is, or a liar (most often for the needs of public or political argumentation), or hasn’t thought about it seriously. No one can be affirmative if it is at the same time a question of principle and a pragmatic question. A question of principle because, in the last analysis we decide ourselves according to our beliefs, our feelings that we formalises and rationalise as political and moral principles (see for a telling example Lorenzo’s justification of his preference for what he calls the UK-liberal model). A pragmatic question because we apply those principles to conjectures we make about what this constitution’s effects will be. I can see how some people can have certainties about the rightness of their principles but it would be simply foolish to pretend to know what will happen in the future. Of course it’s not a good enough reason not to take a position but the position we take should remain aware of this.
Tuesday, April 12, 2005
The EU Constitution? I'll give it a try.
Ok folks, I'm taking the plunge. I will try and fit in and discuss the EU Constitution (sort of). Keep your fingers crossed!!!
My dear friend and co-blogger, Srdjan Cvijic wrote in an earlier blog post.
Srdjan then goes on to discuss how classical political theory considers sovereignty to be a product of democratic legitimacy.
I won't argue with Srdjan, who knows much more than I do, about classical underpinnings of sovereignty. I will quibble with him about what makes the EU different from a nation-state that can result in lessened legitimacy of the EU system...that is, a threshold level presence of sovereignty.
As Stephen Krasner very eloquently outlined in his book "Organized Hypocrisy", the concept of sovereignty is four-fold: interdependence sovereignty (influence of the globalized world manifest through dependency of nations on goods, services, etc. outside of one's own domain); domestic sovereignty (the "final source of authority" that exists in all polities); international legal sovereignty (recognition of the polity by other polities as possessing the ability to affect change within its borders and the ability to engage in international legal obligations); and Westphalian sovereignty (what is usually commonly meant by the "sovereignty", a principle of non-interference).
The ultimate challenge of the EU, in this case being addressed in the context of the formation of the EU Constitution, is how to empower the international polity without eradicating the member states. Clearly, this is the concern of many citizens of many of the nation-states. The crux of their concern is tied to the undebatable point that the further the citizen is from the decision-maker, the less likely that the citizen will be able to impose change. This concern does not necessarily impose the necessary governance of democracy, because even dictators are, to a degree, bound by their citizenry (arguably to a degree more than several EU institutions). But this point DOES tie to the sovereign underpinnings requiring that the nation-state be CAPABLE of imposing change within their own boundaries. As a result, the EU and the nation-states have attempt to strike a balance of power. But as Krasner noted in 1983, international arrangements among like-minded nations are easily "upset when either the balance of power or the perception of national interests...change among those states who negotiate them."
The ultimate point is that, the source of "final authority" remains with the nation-state. Similarly, the nation-state has required that it possess a right to withdraw from the EU. There are procedural barriers to such a withdrawal, but this formalized right demonstrates the presence of "final authority". Until the EU can match such authority, the nation-state DOES retain a heightened legitimacy to the EU...the type of heightened legitimacy that only final authority can provide.
My dear friend and co-blogger, Srdjan Cvijic wrote in an earlier blog post.
To criticize the EU for being a neo-liberal construction[], undermines the complexity of this polity but also implicitly advances a fallacious argument that nation-state (EU Member States) have greater legitimacy than the EU. This argument is based solely on theoretical prejudicing in favour of the nation-state centred classical political theory.
Srdjan then goes on to discuss how classical political theory considers sovereignty to be a product of democratic legitimacy.
I won't argue with Srdjan, who knows much more than I do, about classical underpinnings of sovereignty. I will quibble with him about what makes the EU different from a nation-state that can result in lessened legitimacy of the EU system...that is, a threshold level presence of sovereignty.
As Stephen Krasner very eloquently outlined in his book "Organized Hypocrisy", the concept of sovereignty is four-fold: interdependence sovereignty (influence of the globalized world manifest through dependency of nations on goods, services, etc. outside of one's own domain); domestic sovereignty (the "final source of authority" that exists in all polities); international legal sovereignty (recognition of the polity by other polities as possessing the ability to affect change within its borders and the ability to engage in international legal obligations); and Westphalian sovereignty (what is usually commonly meant by the "sovereignty", a principle of non-interference).
The ultimate challenge of the EU, in this case being addressed in the context of the formation of the EU Constitution, is how to empower the international polity without eradicating the member states. Clearly, this is the concern of many citizens of many of the nation-states. The crux of their concern is tied to the undebatable point that the further the citizen is from the decision-maker, the less likely that the citizen will be able to impose change. This concern does not necessarily impose the necessary governance of democracy, because even dictators are, to a degree, bound by their citizenry (arguably to a degree more than several EU institutions). But this point DOES tie to the sovereign underpinnings requiring that the nation-state be CAPABLE of imposing change within their own boundaries. As a result, the EU and the nation-states have attempt to strike a balance of power. But as Krasner noted in 1983, international arrangements among like-minded nations are easily "upset when either the balance of power or the perception of national interests...change among those states who negotiate them."
The ultimate point is that, the source of "final authority" remains with the nation-state. Similarly, the nation-state has required that it possess a right to withdraw from the EU. There are procedural barriers to such a withdrawal, but this formalized right demonstrates the presence of "final authority". Until the EU can match such authority, the nation-state DOES retain a heightened legitimacy to the EU...the type of heightened legitimacy that only final authority can provide.
Monday, April 11, 2005
For the Constitution
It is time to spring clean the European Constitutional House. To do so, I will divide the main arguments in two domains: law on the one hand, economics on the other.
The legal domain deals with several issues. Part 1 of the EuConst concerns the institutional arrangements. Part 2 concerns the charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, Part 4 concerns various legal disposition, including the issue of revision of the constitutional treaty.
The domain of economics is dealt with primarily in part 3 of the EuConst. An observation is in order to dispel certain basic problems. Part 3 does not say anything fundamentally new: it gathers and organises previous texts and principles, which are part of the European construction.
If we compare the two domains, the first observation we can make is that the legal/constitutional domain introduces the major innovations. For the rest, the constitution makes the previous texts more transparent in that it unites them in a single text.
In this blog, Raphael argued against the constitution mainly because of its committment to a neo-liberal ideology. Raphael insists that this ideology, which is encapsulated in several articles, is at odds with a genuine left wing stand point. As a result, he argues, he wants to reject this neo-liberal ideology, which the constitution rigidifies.
Since we said that part 3 of the EUconst doesn't introduce anything new, we can safely conclude that Raphael wishes to reject the principles and the practices of the european economical order as they stem from previous treaties and practices. Thus, striclty speaking, he has no argument against this constitution. At best, he can say that the constitution rigidifies the past practice. But this is not a good argument, because the constitution does not rigidify things anymore than a treaty does. If anything, the Euconst makes it slightly more flexible, since it introduces few simplified revision procedures requiring the qualified majority as opposed to unanimity.
The core of the debates that is raging in France, therefore, doesn't concern the legal/constitutional domain, but the domain of economics. I'd like to put it this way: A French 'dirigist' political economy is competing with an UK liberal political economy. This opposition has been distorted in debates. First distortion: the French dirigist model is associated with a leftist position (see Raphael). But, as a commentator to this blog noted, this argument "rests upon the unwarranted assumption that a more integrated European market is at odds with “social justice” (or some other set of left-wing values)."
Coming from France, a country which strenuously protects its farmers through the CAP to the detriment of african agriculture, this is at least ironic. Now, moreover, France would like to protect its expensive services to the detriment of eastern competitors. The Bolkenstein saga is there to prove it. I personally challenge every Frenchmen to tell me why they do not like the directive on services. In any case, I honestly do not think that France has the monopoly of the definition of leftist values.
The second distortion to the dirigist/liberal debate is nicely captured in Srdjan's contribution: "To criticize the EU for being a neo-liberal construction tout court, undermines the complexity of this polity but also implicitly advances a fallacious argument that nation-state (EU Member States) have greater legitimacy than the EU. This argument is based solely on theoretical prejudicing in favour of the nation-state centred classical political theory."
To conclude, the EuConst is far from being an ideal document. On this, everyone agrees, including the very authors of the text. The arguments against it are, however, very weak. Unless you espouse a Franco centered vision of Europe where France (together with Germany) decides what part of the european budget goes for agriculture, and which public services should be screened off from competition, you'll find the opposite model (UK-liberal) more appealing. It is not the most appealing, it has its own defects which can be modulated and corrected.
I wish to end on a personal note. As a young European, who speaks Italian, French, and English, and has been trained in these countries, I could only find a good job in the UK market. It's not everything, but it is a great thing. My choice was between being unemployed in the continent or employed in the UK. I made my choice. What do you choose?
The legal domain deals with several issues. Part 1 of the EuConst concerns the institutional arrangements. Part 2 concerns the charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, Part 4 concerns various legal disposition, including the issue of revision of the constitutional treaty.
The domain of economics is dealt with primarily in part 3 of the EuConst. An observation is in order to dispel certain basic problems. Part 3 does not say anything fundamentally new: it gathers and organises previous texts and principles, which are part of the European construction.
If we compare the two domains, the first observation we can make is that the legal/constitutional domain introduces the major innovations. For the rest, the constitution makes the previous texts more transparent in that it unites them in a single text.
In this blog, Raphael argued against the constitution mainly because of its committment to a neo-liberal ideology. Raphael insists that this ideology, which is encapsulated in several articles, is at odds with a genuine left wing stand point. As a result, he argues, he wants to reject this neo-liberal ideology, which the constitution rigidifies.
Since we said that part 3 of the EUconst doesn't introduce anything new, we can safely conclude that Raphael wishes to reject the principles and the practices of the european economical order as they stem from previous treaties and practices. Thus, striclty speaking, he has no argument against this constitution. At best, he can say that the constitution rigidifies the past practice. But this is not a good argument, because the constitution does not rigidify things anymore than a treaty does. If anything, the Euconst makes it slightly more flexible, since it introduces few simplified revision procedures requiring the qualified majority as opposed to unanimity.
The core of the debates that is raging in France, therefore, doesn't concern the legal/constitutional domain, but the domain of economics. I'd like to put it this way: A French 'dirigist' political economy is competing with an UK liberal political economy. This opposition has been distorted in debates. First distortion: the French dirigist model is associated with a leftist position (see Raphael). But, as a commentator to this blog noted, this argument "rests upon the unwarranted assumption that a more integrated European market is at odds with “social justice” (or some other set of left-wing values)."
Coming from France, a country which strenuously protects its farmers through the CAP to the detriment of african agriculture, this is at least ironic. Now, moreover, France would like to protect its expensive services to the detriment of eastern competitors. The Bolkenstein saga is there to prove it. I personally challenge every Frenchmen to tell me why they do not like the directive on services. In any case, I honestly do not think that France has the monopoly of the definition of leftist values.
The second distortion to the dirigist/liberal debate is nicely captured in Srdjan's contribution: "To criticize the EU for being a neo-liberal construction tout court, undermines the complexity of this polity but also implicitly advances a fallacious argument that nation-state (EU Member States) have greater legitimacy than the EU. This argument is based solely on theoretical prejudicing in favour of the nation-state centred classical political theory."
To conclude, the EuConst is far from being an ideal document. On this, everyone agrees, including the very authors of the text. The arguments against it are, however, very weak. Unless you espouse a Franco centered vision of Europe where France (together with Germany) decides what part of the european budget goes for agriculture, and which public services should be screened off from competition, you'll find the opposite model (UK-liberal) more appealing. It is not the most appealing, it has its own defects which can be modulated and corrected.
I wish to end on a personal note. As a young European, who speaks Italian, French, and English, and has been trained in these countries, I could only find a good job in the UK market. It's not everything, but it is a great thing. My choice was between being unemployed in the continent or employed in the UK. I made my choice. What do you choose?
Friday, April 08, 2005
The Pope: Do not speak ill of the dead and political responsibility
Many people who are normally very critical of the Catholic Church, due to Pope’s death, refrain from criticizing it. They are either convinced by the, at times very partial, media shower of pro-Pope propaganda or they simply find it tasteless to make any negative comments at this point, led by the “do not speak ill of the dead” dictum. We decided to publish some critical comments about the pope and the global role of the Catholic Church (see 1, 2 and 3).
Concerning this issue, Jonathan Steele, author of one of the three articles quoted in this blog entry says,
The deaths of the powerful elicit extravagant claims, and many of the tributes to the man being buried in Rome today have been little short of grotesque. Dumbing-down comes over obituary writers, and in their eagerness to define a clear legacy they often produce simplifications that take no account of how the world and people change. (as cited by Arthur Dickenson, esq.)
Concerning this issue, Jonathan Steele, author of one of the three articles quoted in this blog entry says,
The deaths of the powerful elicit extravagant claims, and many of the tributes to the man being buried in Rome today have been little short of grotesque. Dumbing-down comes over obituary writers, and in their eagerness to define a clear legacy they often produce simplifications that take no account of how the world and people change. (as cited by Arthur Dickenson, esq.)
EU: a neo-liberal project?
Raphael Paour’s elaborated invitation to vote “no” in the French referendum on the European constitution made me reflect on the theoretical debate behind the nature of the EU. Does the historical development of the Union present a construction of the essentially neo-liberal project or does it leave space for other political and economic doctrines?
John Rawls, in one of his rare (possibly the only- John Rawls and Philippe Van Parijs, “Three Letters on the Law of Peoples and the European Union”, Revue de Philosophie Économique, No. 118, July 2003, p. 15.) texts about the EU, criticizes the nature of this polity in the following way,
[t]he large open market including all of Europe is aim of the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit. The idea of economic growth, onwards and upwards, with no specific end in sight, fits this class perfectly. If they speak about distribution, it is [a]lmost always in terms of trickle down.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recognized that many view the EU as “…a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless ‘Eurocracy’ in Brussels-at best boring, at worst dangerous.” Joseph Weiler reminds about the democratic deficit at the EU level and calls the EU, “output oriented democracy.” The essence of such political project is that its power is legitimised not through consent of the population but through the results of the government, in terms of improving the living standard of the people, increasing security etc.
To criticize the EU for being a neo-liberal construction tout court, undermines the complexity of this polity but also implicitly advances a fallacious argument that nation-state (EU Member States) have greater legitimacy than the EU. This argument is based solely on theoretical prejudicing in favour of the nation-state centred classical political theory.
True, popular participation in the elections for the European Parliament is lower than in national elections. European Parliament, despite recent changes, still lags behind national legislative bodies, in terms of the amount of power conferred to it by the constitution. Europeans still continue to read their national newspapers and watch their national TV programs. This is also for the fact that there is no European wide lingua franca. The examples demonstrating the inferiority of the EU over the nation-state in terms of political legitimacy are endless.
Yet, all this arguments undermine an underlying nature of the EU, suggesting that EU is a polity in motion. Not so long ago today’s Member States of the Union were bitter foes. Today they are intrinsically intertwined and, despite many problems, build their future together.
Moreover, aforementioned critique of the EU’s lack of political legitimacy from the perspective of the nation states is deeply affected by the bias towards classical conceptions of state sovereignty that considers the democratic principle a monopolistic source of legitimacy of the polity.
In this way, British scholar Theodora Kostakopoulou advances a concept of floating sovereignty, grasping an essential characteristic of the EU that is endowed with a dynamic and transformative capacity. She argues,
After all, sovereignty has persisted as an ideology and organizing principle of the international system because it has helped to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of the society in the name of the general will or public interest. If sovereignty is no longer necessary for the evolution of the state how could state power be legitimized?
Her answer is thus, not to destroy the concept of sovereignty, but to re-conceptualise it in the way to disconnect it from the automatic linkage with the classical notion of popular sovereignty. Kostakopoulou argues,
…What this means in reality is that the state will no longer be in a position to command the loyalty of its citizens, but it would have to purchase it through its capacity to meet social needs, to fulfil its basic functions and through the normative qualities of its policies and institutions.
This argument of course does not completely undermine the principle of democratic legitimacy but merely aspires to demonstrate how the EU shows that political power can be justified from other sources and by other means.
The EU thus, might be less ‘legitimate’ in terms of the classical political theory, but it offers numerous advantages that are not present within the framework of the nation-state. Apart from the obvious advantages of peace and prosperity, its supranational nature offers a structural possibility for overcoming illnesses of the state dominated by the nation, one of the most illustrative examples is that, through the concept of “internal enlargement” . Thus, quite paradoxically, rather then undermining citizen’s power to have an influence on state matters, by dethroning the nation state, it creates an opportunity to develop new forms of direct, deliberative democracy on the lower level, closer to the people.
It is for this reason that one should vote for the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (i.e. EU Constitution). The nation-state does not protect the population from the dangers of neo-liberalism, but rather exposes the people to this danger. The European Constitution presents a modest step towards the dethroning of the nation-state in Europe. Embarking on such a road indeed does make us risk and loose the little power that we currently have to make an influence on the decision making process, nevertheless, it creates the possibility to advance towards new innovative forms of democracy were people will have a real say in matters that influence their everyday life. Making such a risk pays off, because, the powers that we have in the nation state are so little that we can afford the risk of losing them.
John Rawls, in one of his rare (possibly the only- John Rawls and Philippe Van Parijs, “Three Letters on the Law of Peoples and the European Union”, Revue de Philosophie Économique, No. 118, July 2003, p. 15.) texts about the EU, criticizes the nature of this polity in the following way,
[t]he large open market including all of Europe is aim of the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit. The idea of economic growth, onwards and upwards, with no specific end in sight, fits this class perfectly. If they speak about distribution, it is [a]lmost always in terms of trickle down.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recognized that many view the EU as “…a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless ‘Eurocracy’ in Brussels-at best boring, at worst dangerous.” Joseph Weiler reminds about the democratic deficit at the EU level and calls the EU, “output oriented democracy.” The essence of such political project is that its power is legitimised not through consent of the population but through the results of the government, in terms of improving the living standard of the people, increasing security etc.
To criticize the EU for being a neo-liberal construction tout court, undermines the complexity of this polity but also implicitly advances a fallacious argument that nation-state (EU Member States) have greater legitimacy than the EU. This argument is based solely on theoretical prejudicing in favour of the nation-state centred classical political theory.
True, popular participation in the elections for the European Parliament is lower than in national elections. European Parliament, despite recent changes, still lags behind national legislative bodies, in terms of the amount of power conferred to it by the constitution. Europeans still continue to read their national newspapers and watch their national TV programs. This is also for the fact that there is no European wide lingua franca. The examples demonstrating the inferiority of the EU over the nation-state in terms of political legitimacy are endless.
Yet, all this arguments undermine an underlying nature of the EU, suggesting that EU is a polity in motion. Not so long ago today’s Member States of the Union were bitter foes. Today they are intrinsically intertwined and, despite many problems, build their future together.
Moreover, aforementioned critique of the EU’s lack of political legitimacy from the perspective of the nation states is deeply affected by the bias towards classical conceptions of state sovereignty that considers the democratic principle a monopolistic source of legitimacy of the polity.
In this way, British scholar Theodora Kostakopoulou advances a concept of floating sovereignty, grasping an essential characteristic of the EU that is endowed with a dynamic and transformative capacity. She argues,
After all, sovereignty has persisted as an ideology and organizing principle of the international system because it has helped to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of the society in the name of the general will or public interest. If sovereignty is no longer necessary for the evolution of the state how could state power be legitimized?
Her answer is thus, not to destroy the concept of sovereignty, but to re-conceptualise it in the way to disconnect it from the automatic linkage with the classical notion of popular sovereignty. Kostakopoulou argues,
…What this means in reality is that the state will no longer be in a position to command the loyalty of its citizens, but it would have to purchase it through its capacity to meet social needs, to fulfil its basic functions and through the normative qualities of its policies and institutions.
This argument of course does not completely undermine the principle of democratic legitimacy but merely aspires to demonstrate how the EU shows that political power can be justified from other sources and by other means.
The EU thus, might be less ‘legitimate’ in terms of the classical political theory, but it offers numerous advantages that are not present within the framework of the nation-state. Apart from the obvious advantages of peace and prosperity, its supranational nature offers a structural possibility for overcoming illnesses of the state dominated by the nation, one of the most illustrative examples is that, through the concept of “internal enlargement” . Thus, quite paradoxically, rather then undermining citizen’s power to have an influence on state matters, by dethroning the nation state, it creates an opportunity to develop new forms of direct, deliberative democracy on the lower level, closer to the people.
It is for this reason that one should vote for the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (i.e. EU Constitution). The nation-state does not protect the population from the dangers of neo-liberalism, but rather exposes the people to this danger. The European Constitution presents a modest step towards the dethroning of the nation-state in Europe. Embarking on such a road indeed does make us risk and loose the little power that we currently have to make an influence on the decision making process, nevertheless, it creates the possibility to advance towards new innovative forms of democracy were people will have a real say in matters that influence their everyday life. Making such a risk pays off, because, the powers that we have in the nation state are so little that we can afford the risk of losing them.
Italian Indifference towards European Constitution
On 6 April, Italy ratified the European Constitution after the vote at the Senate. The majority is very clear: 217 senators for the Constitution, 16 against. The opposition reunites the comunist party (Rifondazione Comunista) and the Northern Ligue. Italy, as a result, is the fifth country to ratify the Constitution, after Lithuania (11 November), Hungary (20 December), Slovenia (1 February) and Spain (Referendum on 20 February).
This decision is not a surprise; the approbation by Senate was a mere formality, after the vote at the lower chamber(25 January). But what is really surprising is that this news goes completely unnoticed, while the debate about this text is raging in other countries (read France). Partly this is due to the interest in the Pope's death, and subsequently in his funerals. This, however, could not justify the total lack of awareness for this important event. Who is responsible for this? I think that the responsibility can be shared amongst the government (and the opposition), the media, and the people. The tacit approval of the European Constitution deligitimises those who will criticise the text in the future. Why didn't they say anything at the right moment?
This decision is not a surprise; the approbation by Senate was a mere formality, after the vote at the lower chamber(25 January). But what is really surprising is that this news goes completely unnoticed, while the debate about this text is raging in other countries (read France). Partly this is due to the interest in the Pope's death, and subsequently in his funerals. This, however, could not justify the total lack of awareness for this important event. Who is responsible for this? I think that the responsibility can be shared amongst the government (and the opposition), the media, and the people. The tacit approval of the European Constitution deligitimises those who will criticise the text in the future. Why didn't they say anything at the right moment?
Wednesday, April 06, 2005
The Pope's death, the Muslim veil and the principle of Laicité
Last year a very interesting debate took place in France regarding the possibility to forbid, by law, young girls to attend public school wearing Muslim veils. The debate was interesting, among other reasons, because it involved constitutional principles. In a country where the constitutionality of laws can only be checked a priori - before they become effective - constitutional rights can't really be invoked by citizens in front of ordinary courts. Therefore these rights, which are of little use to the citizens, are not well known and they don't make for convincing arguments in public debates. The debate about the veil was an exception to this rule because the relevant right was laïcité which is thought to be consubstantial with the French republic. Those that disagreed with the law had to bring forward arguments about principles as well: different conceptions of laïcité, equality, liberty etc. This particularity contributed to making this debate exceptionaly interesting.
But it was never clear to which extent the belief in a conception of laïcité coherent with such a law was not fuelled by a racist rejection of Islam. Except for notably racist individuals and political parties, it was not possible to establish it and we were forced to continue discussing principles when the real motives of the law may have been, in many cases, despicable "emotions" or the belief that the French republic has, and should preserve, a catholic identity (in other words, the negation of laïcité).
The commemorations around the Pope’s death, unexpectedly, give us the possibility to test the honesty of the argument of laïcité used in favour of this law. A strange debate started two days ago when the government gave its instructions following the Pope's death (the national flag at half mast, some public workers were aloud to miss work to go to church, the Parliament respected a minute of silence etc.). Many people, especially from the left-wing parties, believe that public institutions should not acknowledge this event and that, if officials can participate in the mourning as private citizens, they should not do so as public officials. Members of Government have two justifications: 1/ public officials are indeed mourning as private citizens, 2/ the Pope's death is acknowledged because he was the Head of a foreign State. However, Dominique de Villepin, minister of internal affairs, "invited", with insistence, the main representatives of the State in the administrative divisions of the country to attend the religious celebrations of the Pope's death. This falls outside the official justification given by the government. What is acknowledged by this type of conduct is the deeply catholic identity of the French republic, in the eyes of the current majority. It gives a whole new perspective on the motivation of the main promoters of the law against the Muslim veil. A few months ago, girls were forbidden to wear a veil in school in the name of laïcité: “to preserve every citizen’s liberty of conscience and equality” so they were told. What are they to think now that notwithstanding this principle, public officials are instructed to attend church? In my mind, it’s not a bad thing that a country has a dominant catholic heritage, it can be dealt with in order not to discriminate against individuals that don't, but it is now easy to see what perverse effects it can have when it is hidden behind principles.
But it was never clear to which extent the belief in a conception of laïcité coherent with such a law was not fuelled by a racist rejection of Islam. Except for notably racist individuals and political parties, it was not possible to establish it and we were forced to continue discussing principles when the real motives of the law may have been, in many cases, despicable "emotions" or the belief that the French republic has, and should preserve, a catholic identity (in other words, the negation of laïcité).
The commemorations around the Pope’s death, unexpectedly, give us the possibility to test the honesty of the argument of laïcité used in favour of this law. A strange debate started two days ago when the government gave its instructions following the Pope's death (the national flag at half mast, some public workers were aloud to miss work to go to church, the Parliament respected a minute of silence etc.). Many people, especially from the left-wing parties, believe that public institutions should not acknowledge this event and that, if officials can participate in the mourning as private citizens, they should not do so as public officials. Members of Government have two justifications: 1/ public officials are indeed mourning as private citizens, 2/ the Pope's death is acknowledged because he was the Head of a foreign State. However, Dominique de Villepin, minister of internal affairs, "invited", with insistence, the main representatives of the State in the administrative divisions of the country to attend the religious celebrations of the Pope's death. This falls outside the official justification given by the government. What is acknowledged by this type of conduct is the deeply catholic identity of the French republic, in the eyes of the current majority. It gives a whole new perspective on the motivation of the main promoters of the law against the Muslim veil. A few months ago, girls were forbidden to wear a veil in school in the name of laïcité: “to preserve every citizen’s liberty of conscience and equality” so they were told. What are they to think now that notwithstanding this principle, public officials are instructed to attend church? In my mind, it’s not a bad thing that a country has a dominant catholic heritage, it can be dealt with in order not to discriminate against individuals that don't, but it is now easy to see what perverse effects it can have when it is hidden behind principles.
Tuesday, April 05, 2005
"The Limits of International Law" by Goldsmith & Posner
If you haven't checked this book out yet, you really should. There has been an evolving debate in international legal scholarship about the place of rational choice theory in international law. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner make a very strong argument that, if nothing else, the views of rational choice theorists must now be taken into account in any theory of international law. For those unfamiliar with "rational choice", it is a theory that starts with a premise that states act rationally to maximize their own interests. It has often been used in political science work, but has, until recently, been underutilized in international law. Instead of focusing on legitimacy mechanisms (Franck) or norm internalization (Koh), the authors find that the compliance question of international law is simple. The conclusion reached by Goldsmith & Posner is that states follow international law when it is in their interests to do so.
American international law scholars have been debating and arguing over the views of the likes of Goldsmith / Curtis Bradley / Posner and John Yoo for awhile, but I think its time for European scholars to stop simply dismissing their views and attempt to either invalidate them or explain their deficiencies. For instance, the classic European views on customary international law, based in practice and opinio juris are taken so for granted that they are rarely challenged anymore. Instead, it seems that most scholars feel that acknowledging the weaknesses of these concepts does not require them to explain these weaknesses or how they affect the functioning of international law generally. In "The Limits of International Law" Goldsmith and Posner boil down the functionality of international law into four categories: coincidence of interest, coercion, coordination and cooperation. These categories explain nearly all the functioning of international law that takes place.
I imagine that coercion and coincidence of interest are self explanatory. Coordination is describes circumstances where states are more interested in creating a rule that governs their behavior rather than the substance of the rule itself. Cooperation occurs where states reciprocally refrain from activities that would otherwise be in their immediate or short-term self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term benefits.
Ultimately, Goldsmith and Posner argue, international legal compliance flows from these self-interested motives rather than a vague notion of opinio juris or norm internalization.
There is a draft of many of their ideas in the book and I challenge my co-bloggers (or any other commentator) to refute them. My point is not that these ideas are infallible, but that they are much stronger than you might think.
American international law scholars have been debating and arguing over the views of the likes of Goldsmith / Curtis Bradley / Posner and John Yoo for awhile, but I think its time for European scholars to stop simply dismissing their views and attempt to either invalidate them or explain their deficiencies. For instance, the classic European views on customary international law, based in practice and opinio juris are taken so for granted that they are rarely challenged anymore. Instead, it seems that most scholars feel that acknowledging the weaknesses of these concepts does not require them to explain these weaknesses or how they affect the functioning of international law generally. In "The Limits of International Law" Goldsmith and Posner boil down the functionality of international law into four categories: coincidence of interest, coercion, coordination and cooperation. These categories explain nearly all the functioning of international law that takes place.
I imagine that coercion and coincidence of interest are self explanatory. Coordination is describes circumstances where states are more interested in creating a rule that governs their behavior rather than the substance of the rule itself. Cooperation occurs where states reciprocally refrain from activities that would otherwise be in their immediate or short-term self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term benefits.
Ultimately, Goldsmith and Posner argue, international legal compliance flows from these self-interested motives rather than a vague notion of opinio juris or norm internalization.
There is a draft of many of their ideas in the book and I challenge my co-bloggers (or any other commentator) to refute them. My point is not that these ideas are infallible, but that they are much stronger than you might think.
Monday, April 04, 2005
The Pope and Human Rights
John Paul II deeply believed in Human Rights. They were one of the most recurrent topic in his speeches, particularly freedom of religion. He cared deeply in social justice, and travelled extensively to spread this message.
Yet, his understanding of human rights is at times quite incoherent, and in the end very problematic. Where does the incohererence lie? It concerns the degree of autonomy that human rights are meant to provide the individuals with. In short, the primacy of human rights means that certain spheres of human behaviour cannot be strictly regulated by the legislator, but should be left open so that the individual could make up his own mind as to which behaviour suits him best.
In the Pope's mind, however, the spheres of autonomy left to the individuals are considerably shrunk. In particular, the pope displayed a very conservative understanding of sexual morality. Sex is understood exclusively as a means to an end: procreation. Any other understanding of sex is bound to deviate the individual from the right path. As a consequence, perhaps more importantly, any form of prevention to procreation was condamned by the Vatican. In practical terms, this caused a great evil in countries such Africa, where AIDS was as prominent as the catholic belief in no contraception. Coming to life with a deadly illness, which was the case of tens of thousands african children, is without any doubt a tragedy.
The Pope, who claimed to be so attached to human rights and social justice, should have embraced an understanding of rights based on a stronger conception of autonomy, especially when his own understanding led to social tragedies as the one mentioned before. Let's hope that the next Pope will be as committed to human rights as John Paul II, but less conservative in his interpretation of individual liberty.
Yet, his understanding of human rights is at times quite incoherent, and in the end very problematic. Where does the incohererence lie? It concerns the degree of autonomy that human rights are meant to provide the individuals with. In short, the primacy of human rights means that certain spheres of human behaviour cannot be strictly regulated by the legislator, but should be left open so that the individual could make up his own mind as to which behaviour suits him best.
In the Pope's mind, however, the spheres of autonomy left to the individuals are considerably shrunk. In particular, the pope displayed a very conservative understanding of sexual morality. Sex is understood exclusively as a means to an end: procreation. Any other understanding of sex is bound to deviate the individual from the right path. As a consequence, perhaps more importantly, any form of prevention to procreation was condamned by the Vatican. In practical terms, this caused a great evil in countries such Africa, where AIDS was as prominent as the catholic belief in no contraception. Coming to life with a deadly illness, which was the case of tens of thousands african children, is without any doubt a tragedy.
The Pope, who claimed to be so attached to human rights and social justice, should have embraced an understanding of rights based on a stronger conception of autonomy, especially when his own understanding led to social tragedies as the one mentioned before. Let's hope that the next Pope will be as committed to human rights as John Paul II, but less conservative in his interpretation of individual liberty.
Friday, April 01, 2005
Today’s news
Today the European Union abolished the restrictions on immigration from outside of the Union, from now on only criminals and terrorists will be denied entry.
Today, the United States of America abolished the death penalty, disbanded the detention centre in Guantanamo, dismantled the protection fence towards Mexico and, to Huntington’s horror, recognized Spanish as the second official language.
Today Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, countries of the Western Balkans, North Africa, Middle East and ex-Soviet Union entered the EU and the Union proclaimed an ongoing commitment to further enlargement, until the “Confederation Earth”.
Today the United States of America and the Russian Federation applied for the EU membership.
Today Tobin tax got accepted by the entire international community and UN member states collectively agreed to implement policies and enact legislation that seriously and radically restricts pollution.
Today Bush resigned, Nader won and Putin lost the elections and all major right wing European parties are doing very badly in the opinion polls.
Today the Pope encouraged people to use condoms.
Today Berlusconi is in prison.
Today proletarian expropriation is recognized as a legal form of civil disobedience.
Today United States won the World Cup in football/soccer thanks to miraculous goals of Freddy Adu and Landon Donovan.
For further indebt analysis of this news please check here.
Today, the United States of America abolished the death penalty, disbanded the detention centre in Guantanamo, dismantled the protection fence towards Mexico and, to Huntington’s horror, recognized Spanish as the second official language.
Today Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, countries of the Western Balkans, North Africa, Middle East and ex-Soviet Union entered the EU and the Union proclaimed an ongoing commitment to further enlargement, until the “Confederation Earth”.
Today the United States of America and the Russian Federation applied for the EU membership.
Today Tobin tax got accepted by the entire international community and UN member states collectively agreed to implement policies and enact legislation that seriously and radically restricts pollution.
Today Bush resigned, Nader won and Putin lost the elections and all major right wing European parties are doing very badly in the opinion polls.
Today the Pope encouraged people to use condoms.
Today Berlusconi is in prison.
Today proletarian expropriation is recognized as a legal form of civil disobedience.
Today United States won the World Cup in football/soccer thanks to miraculous goals of Freddy Adu and Landon Donovan.
For further indebt analysis of this news please check here.
Thursday, March 31, 2005
More on proletarian expropriation
Check the "Europhobia" blog for extremely interesting views about the debates evolving around the European Union and much more. For their interpretation of our presentation of the theoretical background to proletarian expropriation check here.
Wolfowitz in/and Europe
Perhaps surprisingly, we have not yet discussed here Bush's two controversial recent appointments: John Bolton, an arch unilateralist and neoconservative as the US ambassador to the United Nations; and Paul Wolfowitz, "architect of the Iraq war" and neoconservative to the head of the World Bank. The latter has proved the more controversial of the two; however, it seems that, after a trip to Europe yesterday, Wolfowitz has won over enough people in Europe to ensure that his appointment won't be blocked. Such a move would have been unprecedented; by traditionm, the US chooses the head of the World Bank, while the EU selects the head of the IMF. Both, however, possess the formal power to block the other's nomination; after yesterday, however, it is clear that Europe will not do so in this case.
Perhaps most surprising, and most concerning from a European point of view, is not the mere fact, as many have suggested, that both appointments seem to send a clear signal to the world about the US's intentions to make use of multilateral institutions to further its own policy goals: such cannot, in all honesty, have come as a particular surprise to anybody. However, it does seem to me that there is, in the personalities selected, a message directly from Bush to Europe that, regarded in isolation, seems surprising; when put into the context of the last few months, becomes little short of astonishing.
I posted a couple of weeks ago on Bush's apparently successful, "bridge-building" mission to Europe, which itself had built upon the success of Secretary of State Rice's visit a few months earlier. The rhetoric at that time was all about unity: "No temporary debate, no passing disagreement of governments, no power on earth will ever divide us", proclaimed President Bush - a clear reference to the war on Iraq. Many in Europe, "old" and "new" alike, were won over by these words, and began to look forward to a new period of transatlantic harmony. America, it seemed, and the Bush administartion in particular, had learned (perhaps from the ongoing troubles in Iraq), that it simply couldn't "go it alone" in terms of its foreign ppolicy goals; it needed its old allies.
Which is what makes the appointments of Bolton and Wolfowitz so astonishing. After his visit to Europe, many will have been expecting the reconciliatory tone to be followed by actions of a similar kind - with, perhaps, someone like Powell being appointmed to the UN post. Far from it: indeed, it is difficult to imagine two appointments more likely to upset Europeans than Bolton to the UN and Wolfowitz to the World Bank. Clare Short, the outspoken ex-Cabinet Minister in the UK, stated that it was as if Bush was sticking "two fingers up to the world" (a statement that may puzzle some Europeans; it means something similar to the one-fingered "salute"). Given the context of transatlantic relations in the first few months of the year, the insult must have been particularly keenly felt in Europe.
Bush will have been only too aware of the reaction that these appointments was likely to generate. They can only be viewed as a very deliberately orchestrated show of strength, with Europe as the primary intended audience. For the moment, it seems to have worked; Europe will not block Wolfowitz, and in all likelihood would not have even if reconcialtory noises about a senior role in his World Bank leadership team, or even support for Frenchman Pascal Lamy's candidature for the head of the WTO, had not been forthcoming. With these appointments, then, Bush has firmly (and, I suggest, quite deliberately) re-established the US as the senior partner in the transatlantic alliance, despite the rhetoric of togetherness that had characterised the months in the leadup to these announcements. However, he may be storing up problems for the future. In the UK, it seems that, amongst the senior members of Government, practically only Tony Blair was unphased by the decision (indeed, he knew about it some time in advance, and neglected to forewarn his Cabinet colleagues). Perhaps most significantly, Gordon Brown, currently Chancellor of the Exchequer but the man many in Britian believe - and hope - will be the next Prime Minister, was described by sources close to him as "incandescent" at the Wolfowitz nomination in particular. It will be interesting to see, with time, if the deeply symbolic implications of these two appointments for EU-US relations do not come back to haunt Bush, or, if the situation was to arise, any Republican successor.
Perhaps most surprising, and most concerning from a European point of view, is not the mere fact, as many have suggested, that both appointments seem to send a clear signal to the world about the US's intentions to make use of multilateral institutions to further its own policy goals: such cannot, in all honesty, have come as a particular surprise to anybody. However, it does seem to me that there is, in the personalities selected, a message directly from Bush to Europe that, regarded in isolation, seems surprising; when put into the context of the last few months, becomes little short of astonishing.
I posted a couple of weeks ago on Bush's apparently successful, "bridge-building" mission to Europe, which itself had built upon the success of Secretary of State Rice's visit a few months earlier. The rhetoric at that time was all about unity: "No temporary debate, no passing disagreement of governments, no power on earth will ever divide us", proclaimed President Bush - a clear reference to the war on Iraq. Many in Europe, "old" and "new" alike, were won over by these words, and began to look forward to a new period of transatlantic harmony. America, it seemed, and the Bush administartion in particular, had learned (perhaps from the ongoing troubles in Iraq), that it simply couldn't "go it alone" in terms of its foreign ppolicy goals; it needed its old allies.
Which is what makes the appointments of Bolton and Wolfowitz so astonishing. After his visit to Europe, many will have been expecting the reconciliatory tone to be followed by actions of a similar kind - with, perhaps, someone like Powell being appointmed to the UN post. Far from it: indeed, it is difficult to imagine two appointments more likely to upset Europeans than Bolton to the UN and Wolfowitz to the World Bank. Clare Short, the outspoken ex-Cabinet Minister in the UK, stated that it was as if Bush was sticking "two fingers up to the world" (a statement that may puzzle some Europeans; it means something similar to the one-fingered "salute"). Given the context of transatlantic relations in the first few months of the year, the insult must have been particularly keenly felt in Europe.
Bush will have been only too aware of the reaction that these appointments was likely to generate. They can only be viewed as a very deliberately orchestrated show of strength, with Europe as the primary intended audience. For the moment, it seems to have worked; Europe will not block Wolfowitz, and in all likelihood would not have even if reconcialtory noises about a senior role in his World Bank leadership team, or even support for Frenchman Pascal Lamy's candidature for the head of the WTO, had not been forthcoming. With these appointments, then, Bush has firmly (and, I suggest, quite deliberately) re-established the US as the senior partner in the transatlantic alliance, despite the rhetoric of togetherness that had characterised the months in the leadup to these announcements. However, he may be storing up problems for the future. In the UK, it seems that, amongst the senior members of Government, practically only Tony Blair was unphased by the decision (indeed, he knew about it some time in advance, and neglected to forewarn his Cabinet colleagues). Perhaps most significantly, Gordon Brown, currently Chancellor of the Exchequer but the man many in Britian believe - and hope - will be the next Prime Minister, was described by sources close to him as "incandescent" at the Wolfowitz nomination in particular. It will be interesting to see, with time, if the deeply symbolic implications of these two appointments for EU-US relations do not come back to haunt Bush, or, if the situation was to arise, any Republican successor.
Wednesday, March 30, 2005
"The Union shall offer its citizens an internal market where competition is free and undistorted" A citizen replies: no thanks !
I will probably vote no at the referendum on the European constitution that, in France, will take place in May. But until then I will try, like almost every one of that opinion, to understand the arguments of those in favour of that constitution. If we set aside the criticism that can be addressed to this text from the point of view of a thick conception of democracy, and stick with the social and economical problem, I cannot understand how a left-wing Yes can be argued for.
Art. I-3: The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted.
Art. III-176: (… )the activities of the Member States and the Union shall
include, as provided in the Constitution, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
Art. III-292-2-e: The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (…) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade
Art. III-131: Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war.
Is it not obvious that these provisions stem from an ideology that cannot be accepted by anyone who believes that political forces should control the market? How can one believe that and at the same time vote for this constitution? Frankly, whishing for a market where competition is free and undistorted, and calling that a value, is not left-wing. I know that, without so many words, such a market is already a value of the European Union and that the constitution doesn’t change all that much to it. But now we are given, finally, a chance to reject such a polity and I, for one, will take it gladly.
Art. I-3: The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted.
Art. III-176: (… )the activities of the Member States and the Union shall
include, as provided in the Constitution, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
Art. III-292-2-e: The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (…) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade
Art. III-131: Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war.
Is it not obvious that these provisions stem from an ideology that cannot be accepted by anyone who believes that political forces should control the market? How can one believe that and at the same time vote for this constitution? Frankly, whishing for a market where competition is free and undistorted, and calling that a value, is not left-wing. I know that, without so many words, such a market is already a value of the European Union and that the constitution doesn’t change all that much to it. But now we are given, finally, a chance to reject such a polity and I, for one, will take it gladly.
Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Chuck D v. Sheryl Crow
The above title is not the name of an episode of MTV's claymation series "Celebrity Death Match" but rather the name I have given the case before the U.S. Supreme Court regarding file sharing. WHile Chuck and Sheryl aren't in the case name, they have been active supporting either the file-sharing techies or the music industry, respectively. The NY Times has an article today giving a basic run down on the case, but the opposing arguments kind of go like this:
File-sharing advocates: You cannot allow the music industry, or any industry, to have a technological veto over developing software. A ruling against file sharing would temporarily curb file sharing (and thus copyright infringements), but would also stunt American growth in technological innovation.
Music Industry: File sharing software is all about stealing. It does not possess the potentially legal uses that VCRs do, but rather is entirely designed to screw the music industry and artists out of their rightful profits.
Usually, I am not particularly sympathetic to an argument that runs that deciding X will "stunt" the growth of an economic process. This is for two reasons. First, most industries are adapatable enough that they will learn to operate within the new rule structure efficiently. Second, if a country wants to "stunt" the growth of an economic good, there is usually a reason that they would make that decision that is apart from an ignorance of the economic consequences. This second point is essentially how I feel about stem cell research. Sure, disallowing (or very limited allowances) of stem cell research in the U.S. DOES put the U.S. behind in innovations that stem cell research could advance, but the country (through its representatives) has decided that it has moral qualms with the research that make the sacrifice palatable.
In this case, however, I have been unable to find a non-economic reason to curb file-sharing software. I suppose one could argue that we have a moral obligation to thwart theft and that file-sharing software facilitates such theft. I don't think this argument flies though, because many studies show that the average citizen simply doesn't view file-sharing as theft (or at least theft bad enough to be punished with any regularity). While you might argue that this view is self-serving, I've got news for opponents of file sharing: If the citizenry doesn't think X is theft...it's not. Sure, it may literally be theft, but if they don't want it prosecuted under such laws, it won't be.
Also, I think my first hesitancy in embracing the techies logic cuts against the music industry here. If only the industry displayed some creativity, it could learn how to make file-sharing more profitable for them. It's their current unwillingness to deviate from prior success that makes their future success more questionable.
In this battle (just as in my high school / college days) I am squarely on Chuck D's side.
File-sharing advocates: You cannot allow the music industry, or any industry, to have a technological veto over developing software. A ruling against file sharing would temporarily curb file sharing (and thus copyright infringements), but would also stunt American growth in technological innovation.
Music Industry: File sharing software is all about stealing. It does not possess the potentially legal uses that VCRs do, but rather is entirely designed to screw the music industry and artists out of their rightful profits.
Usually, I am not particularly sympathetic to an argument that runs that deciding X will "stunt" the growth of an economic process. This is for two reasons. First, most industries are adapatable enough that they will learn to operate within the new rule structure efficiently. Second, if a country wants to "stunt" the growth of an economic good, there is usually a reason that they would make that decision that is apart from an ignorance of the economic consequences. This second point is essentially how I feel about stem cell research. Sure, disallowing (or very limited allowances) of stem cell research in the U.S. DOES put the U.S. behind in innovations that stem cell research could advance, but the country (through its representatives) has decided that it has moral qualms with the research that make the sacrifice palatable.
In this case, however, I have been unable to find a non-economic reason to curb file-sharing software. I suppose one could argue that we have a moral obligation to thwart theft and that file-sharing software facilitates such theft. I don't think this argument flies though, because many studies show that the average citizen simply doesn't view file-sharing as theft (or at least theft bad enough to be punished with any regularity). While you might argue that this view is self-serving, I've got news for opponents of file sharing: If the citizenry doesn't think X is theft...it's not. Sure, it may literally be theft, but if they don't want it prosecuted under such laws, it won't be.
Also, I think my first hesitancy in embracing the techies logic cuts against the music industry here. If only the industry displayed some creativity, it could learn how to make file-sharing more profitable for them. It's their current unwillingness to deviate from prior success that makes their future success more questionable.
In this battle (just as in my high school / college days) I am squarely on Chuck D's side.
Monday, March 28, 2005
Chirac and the European Constitution
Jacques Chirac, from Tokio, made his point on the European Constitution.
Not surprisingly his message does not concern the substance of the debate but only the form. As Raphael pointed out below, the President wishes to present the 'No' to the European Constitution as a tragedy.
This is not sufficient. French people, as well as European people, want to know why the 'No' would be a tragedy, and why the 'Yes' would make us all better off. Chirac has insisted that French people should concentrate on the role of this constitution for the future of Europe and that they should not see it as a chance to change the domestic government. However, given the polls, if the 'no' were to prevail, Chirac should consider this defeat as a personal one.
Not surprisingly his message does not concern the substance of the debate but only the form. As Raphael pointed out below, the President wishes to present the 'No' to the European Constitution as a tragedy.
This is not sufficient. French people, as well as European people, want to know why the 'No' would be a tragedy, and why the 'Yes' would make us all better off. Chirac has insisted that French people should concentrate on the role of this constitution for the future of Europe and that they should not see it as a chance to change the domestic government. However, given the polls, if the 'no' were to prevail, Chirac should consider this defeat as a personal one.
Friday, March 25, 2005
A "No" to the European Constitution coming from UMP
Check here for another argument for "no" in the French referendum, this time coming from the UMP member of the French National Assembly.
Thursday, March 24, 2005
Right to Death Penalty?
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele have recently written an article arguing in favor of the death penalty. As both Sunstein and Vermuele have sterling academic credentials, their work is typically considered very well balanced and influential.
The abstract of the article:
The abstract of the article:
Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many as eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death.Wow. As an opponent to the death penalty, this is about as convincing of evidence I could find to potentially change my mind. My opposition to the death penalty is not rooted in a moral belief that the government should not sponsor killing, but rather in the belief that the government shouldn't be TRUSTED to find out who deserves to be executed. In essence, I don't trust the government with my social security money, so why should I trust them in trying to put people to death. As a result, any evidence that executions represent a clear deterrent to murder means that the morality of the situation (in my eyes at least) is much less obvious. Ultimately, if I were certain that the number of innocent individuals killed (by the government or private citizens) was one less with the death penalty, I would have to think long and hard about whether I would remain opposed to capital punishment.Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent.
The familiar problems with capital punishment -– potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew -– do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat “statistical lives” with the seriousness that they deserve.
Even more complicated is what clear evidence showing that the death penalty saves lives would mean to rights based groups. After all, the most basic thing any government is responsible for is the safety of its citizens, both from domestic and foreign enemies. If the government were to ignore a clear life-saving benefit because of its own squishy moral qualms with the "morality" of government sponsored killing, I think it would have some explaining to do to its public.
This is all besides the point...for now. I don't think Cass and Adrian have made such an overwhelming empirical argument for the death penalty that it's deterrent benefits are clear. But it's not so difficult to imagine a world where the evidence becomes so substantial that it can no longer be ignored. What will we do then?
The US Supreme Court does not want to hear the Schiavo case
Here you find the opinion stated by the court.
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